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Since the enactment of environmental legislation in the 1970s, the 
preliminary injunction standard articulated by the Supreme Court for en-
vironmental claims has evolved from general principles to enumerated 
factors. In Winter v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., the Court’s 
most recent refinement, the Court endorsed but failed to explain the ap-
plication of a common four-factor test when it held that the alleged injury 
to marine mammals was outweighed by the public interest of a well-
trained and prepared Navy.
1
 While a number of commentators have 
speculated about Winter’s impact on future environmental preliminary 
injunctions, this article seeks to more precisely determine Winter’s ef-
fect. It does so by providing a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
data collected from federal district and circuit courts three years before 
and three years after Winter. 
This data demonstrates that not only has the number of injunctions 
granted and denied stayed relatively consistent but most trial courts have 
not altered their approach to environmental preliminary injunction re-
quests. Instead, they continue to look to their circuit court rather than the 
U.S. Supreme Court for guidance when reviewing these requests. Several 
circuit courts have addressed Winter, and apart from the Fourth Circuit, 
these circuits reconciled Winter with their earlier preliminary injunction 
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 1. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
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standard. Thus, while Winter’s effect is significant in form, it is mild in 
substance. 
INTRODUCTION 
The motion for preliminary injunction is a popular tool used by en-
vironmental plaintiffs.
2
 While the factors used to evaluate preliminary 
injunctions have been established for some time, the application of these 
factors has varied.
3
 The “dizzying diversity of [preliminary injunction] 
formulations”4 resulted in “confusion”5 among courts.6 In the environ-
mental context,
7
 one scholar recently remarked that “the supply of [pre-
liminary injunctions] is notoriously uneven, subject to misappropriation, 
and of a perennially-questioned legal pedigree.”8 Judges have called for a 
“uniform federal standard,”9 and scholars have requested “order of a doc-
                                                 
 2. Sierra Club v. Espy, 822 F. Supp. 356, 362 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (noting that preliminary injunc-
tions are “[t]he most common form of remedy sought by citizens suing federal agencies in environ-
mental cases”). 
 3. See, e.g., Bethany M. Bates, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard for Preliminary 
Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522, 1552 (2011) (arguing for uniformity in 
granting preliminary injunctions to prevent “inconsistent and inequitable decisions”); Morton 
Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REV. 
LITIG. 495, 497 (2003) (“‘[C]onfusion persists’ regarding which standard should apply for granting 
or denying the preliminary injunction motion.”). 
 4. John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 526 
(1978). 
 5. See Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting the “confu-
sion” that surrounds the “four-part preliminary injunction standard”). 
 6. Linda J. Silberman, Injunctions by the Numbers: Less Than the Sum of Its Parts, 63 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 279, 279 (1987) (stating “[t]he law on standards for granting or denying preliminary 
injunctions has never been a model of clarity”). 
 7. For purposes of this Article, I have focused on “environmental” preliminary injunctions. I 
agree with those environmental law scholars who argue that environmental injury is different from 
other types of injury because environmental injury cannot be remedied with money damages and can 
span time and space. “Environmental law” is distinct from other areas of the law, and therefore, 
environmental cases should be treated differently from other types of cases. For a detailed discussion 
on the uniqueness of environmental law, see Richard J. Lazarus, Resorting What’s Environmental 
About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 706–07 (2000); see also 
Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL 
L. REV. 221, 282 (2010) (advocating for a use-conflict framework to conceptualize environmental 
law as a distinct legal field). But cf., Jay D. Wexler, The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law, 74 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 260, 261 n.11, (2006) (arguing that environmental law is a subset of adminis-
trative law rather than a radically unique or distinct area of law). 
 8. Jamison E. Colburn, The Cynic at the Circus, 45 TULSA L. REV. 307, 321–22 (2009). 
 9. See Denlow, supra note 3, at 533. 
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trine applied in so many disparate settings.”10 Winter is one of several 
recent Supreme Court decisions that attempt to clarify this doctrine.
11
 
Before Winter, the Court had three opportunities to articulate a clear 
preliminary injunction standard and a clear application of this standard 
for alleged violations of environmental statutes.
12
 In each decision, the 
Court relied on general principles instead of a precise formula when re-
viewing the injunction request.
13
 In Winter, the Court refined these earli-
er decisions and, for the first time, endorsed a four-factor test for prelim-
inary injunctions: “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must es-
tablish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public inter-
est.”14 Thus, the Court clarified the relevant preliminary injunction fac-
tors in environmental cases.
15
 In particular, the Court reinvigorated the 
public interest factor, a factor that had effectively fallen by the way side, 




Even before Winter most lower courts agreed that four factors 
should be evaluated as part of an injunction request.
17
 What courts strug-
gled with and what the Court in Winter failed to fully explain was the 
application of these factors.
18
 For example, should all factors have the 
same weight? Should certain factors be considered threshold factors? Do 
all factors need to be evaluated? Because the Court failed to describe 
                                                 
 10. David Schoenbrod, The Immortality of Equitable Balancing, 96 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 17, 
21 (2010) (noting that it would be a “worthwhile endeavor” for “law professors to” “help the court” 
in this way). 
 11. See Anthony DiSarro, Freeze Frame: The Supreme Court’s Reaffirmation of the Substan-
tive Principles of Preliminary Injunctions, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 51, 83 (2012) (identifying five recent 
Supreme Court decisions, including Winter, that show “the Supreme Court is clearly unwilling to 
permit lower federal courts to alter the traditional standards for assessing whether preliminary in-
junctive relief is appropriate”); Rachel A. Weisshaar, Hazy Shades of Winter: Resolving the Circuit 
Split over Preliminary Injunctions, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1016 (2012) (identifying three recent 
Supreme Court decisions, including Winter, that “provide new clues as to which preliminary injunc-
tion test the Court prefers”). 
 12. See infra Part I. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 19 (2008). In eBay Inc. v. Mer-
cExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), the Supreme Court endorsed a similar four-part test for 
permanent injunctions. 
 15. Colburn, supra note 8, at 322 (stating that in Winter, “[t]he Supreme Court (finally) explic-
itly endorsed [a] four-factored test, perhaps even turning the four factors into elements”). 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See cases in Appendix. 
 18. See infra Part I; see also Morton Denlow, Preliminary Injunctions: Look Before You Leap, 
28 LITIG. 2, 3 (2002) (explaining up to four different standards used by circuit courts, and therefore 
trial courts, and noting that “[t]he standard can greatly impact the result”). 
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how the four factors relate to each other or to the greater purposes of a 
preliminary injunction,
19
 Winter failed to answer the more pressing ques-
tion: how should a trial court apply these factors? 
Consequently, Winter’s significance has been debated. Some com-
mentators predicted that because of its unique facts and narrow holding, 
Winter’s applicability would be limited to only those injunction requests 
involving homeland security or military preparedness.
20
 Others criticized 
Winter for creating a higher preliminary injunction standard by raising 
the bar for a requisite showing of irreparable harm,
21
 most likely making 
it more difficult for environmental plaintiffs to succeed in their future 
requests for preliminary injunctions.
22 
Courts too have characterized the 
Winter standard as being “more rigorous.”23 
Assessing these concerns requires an understanding of earlier Court 
precedent addressing environmental preliminary injunctions. Many 
                                                 
 19. See Bates, supra note 3, at 1552, 1553. The author explains that the sliding-scale analysis 
survives Winter because “contemporary Supreme Court cases also support the use of the sliding 
scale approach.” Id. at 1552. Winter merely held that “only showing a ‘possibility’ of irreparable 
harm was not enough” to obtain a preliminary injunction but “failed to comment on whether courts 
could use a sliding scale analysis or whether a movant could be granted a preliminary injunction 
based on a showing that there are serious questions going to the merits.” Id. at 1523. 
 20. See William S. Eubanks II, Damage Done? The Status of NEPA After Winter v. NRDC and 
Answers to Lingering Questions Left Open by the Court, 33 VT. L. REV. 649, 658 (2009) (“Based on 
its narrow holding on equitable balancing grounds, it is clear that the Court perceived Winter as a 
case predominantly about the public’s interest in military preparedness and less about environmental 
protection under NEPA.”); see also Stephen M. Johnson, The Roberts Court and the Environment, 
37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 317, 343 (2010) (stating that “the Winter Court focused heavily on the 
importance of military readiness in its opinion, so the decision might be limited to disputes arising in 
similar contexts in the future”). 
 21. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Court Sets Higher Hurdle for Preliminary Injunctions, 45 TRIAL 
58, 59 (Jan. 2009) (describing the Supreme Court’s approach as “strict”); see also Benjamin I. Na-
rodick, Winter v. National Resources Defense Council: Going into the Belly of the Whale of Prelim-
inary Injunctions and Environmental Law, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 332, 342 (2009) (calling the 
standard in Winter a “newly intensified standards for obtaining a preliminary injunction”); John C. 
Stellakis, U.S. Navy Torpedoes NEPA: Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council May Sink 
Future Environmental Pleas Brought Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 21 VILL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 353, 378 (2010) (“The Court also expressly set, and arguably raised, the bar for a requi-
site showing of irreparable harm to obtain a preliminary injunction for NEPA actions.”). 
 22. Nate Hausman, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms: Breathing a Sigh of Equitable 
Relief, 25 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 155, 182–83 (2011) (“Post-Winter courts will undoubtedly be more 
reluctant to issue injunctions.”); William Krueger, In the Navy: The Future Strength of Preliminary 
Injunctions Under NEPA in Light of NRDC v. Winter, 10 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 423, 443 (2009) (“This 
new, formulaic rubric for the issuance of an injunction removes much of the flexibility that has his-
torically been the ‘hallmark of equity jurisdiction,’ and will likely lead to a reduced number of in-
junctions in environmental enforcement actions.” (quoting  Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 50 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))). 
 23. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Locke, No. 1:09-cv-01053, 2010 WL 500455, at 
*2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2010); see also RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208–09 (10th Cir. 
2009) (noting that the movant seeking a mandatory preliminary injunction after Winter is required 
“to make a heightened showing of the four factors”). 
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scholars believe that these earlier decisions created a more lenient stand-
ard unique to environmental plaintiffs.
24
 They argue that Winter has 
somehow disrupted the existing standard for environmental plaintiffs.
25
 
Environmental practitioners have a similar perspective: Winter has “had 
a stifling effect” on environmental plaintiffs.26 Many environmental or-
ganizations have abandoned the preliminary injunction route because 
“Winter has implicitly raised the bar.”27 
Absent from this discussion, however, is any study evaluating 
whether, post-Winter, the preliminary injunction standard is more strin-
gent and whether courts are more reluctant to issue injunctions. A more 
fundamental question is whether post-Winter trial courts approach envi-
ronmental preliminary injunctions differently. 
This Article explores these questions through an analysis of quanti-
tative and qualitative data collected from federal district and circuit 
courts three years before and three years after Winter. The quantitative 
analysis counts the number of environmental injunctions granted, denied, 
or granted in part and denied in part during this time, while the qualita-
tive analysis evaluates the content of the judicial decisions focusing on 
the preliminary injunction standard cited and the manner in which the 
preliminary injunction factors are evaluated. 
In Part I, the Article begins by tracing the evolution of the envi-
ronmental preliminary injunction standard from general principles to the 
precise four-factor preliminary injunction standard articulated in Winter. 
Part II describes the Winter decision and highlights concerns from aca-
demics about the Winter decision and its application by trial courts. Part 
III explains the study designed to evaluate changes in the environmental 
preliminary injunction standard in light of Winter’s pronouncement of a 
four-factor standard and presents the qualitative and quantitative results 
of this study. Part IV then provides an assessment of these results. Part V 
concludes. 
                                                 
 24. Eubanks, supra note 20, at 658 (“[I]nterpretations of NEPA’s unique statutory scheme and 
purpose resulted in more lenient irreparable harm analyses in the post-Gambell judicial arena.”); see 
also Sarah Axtell, Reframing the Judicial Approach to Injunctive Relief for Environmental Plaintiffs 
in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 317, 328 (2011) (“For a long time, 
environmental plaintiffs enjoyed strong injunctive relief as a protection from environmental harm.”). 
 25. See Hausman, supra note 22, at 182–83 (“Post-Winter courts will undoubtedly be more 
reluctant to issue injunctions for NEPA violations than before.”). 
 26. Email from Professor Jack Tuholske, Visiting Professor of Law, Dir. of Water & Justice, 
Vermont Law Sch. to Sarah J. Morath, Assistant Professor of Legal Writing, Univ. of Akron Sch. of 
Law (Nov. 11, 2012) (on file with author). 
 27. Id.; see also John E. McCann, Jr., Evolving State and Federal Court Injunction Standards, 
44 MD. B.J. 48, 48 (Jan./Feb. 2011) (explaining that under the Winter standard, “obtaining a prelimi-
nary injunction in the Fourth Circuit . . . is now much more difficult”). Mr. McCann is an assistant 
practice group leader and principal at the law firm Miles & Stockbridge P.C. in Baltimore, MD.  
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Briefly, the quantitative data suggests little change. Injunctions 
overall were denied 51.5% of the time pre-Winter, compared to 53.6% of 
the time post-Winter. Injunction requests under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA), the most commonly used environmental stat-
ute, were denied 53.6% of the time pre-Winter compared to 55.1% of the 
time post-Winter. Similarly, the qualitative data shows little change in 
the injunction standard used by trial courts post-Winter. Trial courts con-
tinue to look to their circuit court for guidance on what standard to apply. 
Seven circuit courts (the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, 
and Tenth) have addressed their standard, either implicitly or explicitly, 
in light of Winter, and of these circuits, only the Fourth Circuit has ex-
pressly held that Winter invalidates its earlier standard.
28
 
Given the disconnect between what scholars argue, what environ-
mental practitioners perceive, and what the quantitative and qualitative 
data demonstrate, perhaps the full effects of Winter have not yet 
emerged. Scholars and practitioners agree that the preliminary injunction 
standard is at a crossroads,
29
 and Winter is unlikely to be the final word 
on preliminary injunctions.
30
 In the absence of further clarification from 
the Court, this article offers a starting point for discussing the appropriate 
preliminary injunction standard for environmental cases. The time is ripe 
for discussing the appropriate standard for preliminary injunctions gener-
ally,
31
 environmental injunctions more specifically, the role of statutes in 
evaluating the injunction request,
32
 and the interrelationship between the 
four preliminary injunction factors.
 33
 
                                                 
 28. The First, Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have not yet weighed in on the validity 
of their earlier standards in light of Winter. See infra Part III. 
 29. See Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Per-
manent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 204 (2012) (“The law of equitable remedies is the in 
midst of an American revolution.”). 
 30. See Paul W. Conable & Frank J. Weiss, Surviving Winter: The Ninth Circuit Reaffirms the 
“Serious Questions” Test for Injunctive Relief, 30 OR. ST. BAR LITIG. J. 15, 19 (2011), available at 
http://www.osblitigation.com/lj2011-fall.pdf (concluding that “it is possible that further guidance 
from the Supreme Court will be forthcoming on this issue”).  
 31. Schoenbrod, supra note 10, at 21 (noting that it would be a “worthwhile endeavor” for law 
professors to “help the court” by “mak[ing] order of a doctrine applied in so many disparate set-
tings”). 
 32. Compare Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 
485, 488 (2010) (arguing that “equitable balancing in statutory cases should be abandoned because it 
conflicts with separation of powers principles”), with Schoenbrod, supra note 10, at 18 (disagreeing 
with Goldstein’s premise that “equitable balancing inevitably gives judges open-ended discretion to 
reach whatever result makes sense to them”). 
 33. Commentators in several recent articles have suggested different applications of the Winter 
standard. See DiSarro, supra note 11, at 90–98 (arguing for a “freeze frame” approach that requires 
proof of both a likelihood of success and irreparable injury); Weisshaar, supra note 11, at 1048 
(arguing that the Supreme Court should adopt a sequential tests and use a serious-questions test in 
narrow circumstances); see also Bates, supra note, 3 at 1523 (arguing that all district courts should 
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
The Winter appeal was not the first time the Court evaluated a pre-
liminary injunction arising from a violation of an environmental statute. 
With the enactment of environmental statutes in the early 1970s, an era 
of citizen enforcement of environmental statutes followed.
34
 Injunctive 
relief quickly became the most common form of remedy sought by citi-
zens suing federal agencies in an environmental case.
35
 In such cases, a 
court would balance the potential harms to each party before deciding 
whether to enjoin the challenged conduct.
36
  Through citizen enforce-
ment actions, the Court issued a series of decisions addressing environ-
mental preliminary injunctions: Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, and Amoco Production Company v. Vil-
lage of Gambell. 
These cases, however, discuss when a court should engage in equi-
table balancing rather than how a court should perform such balancing. 
Thus, while the Court identified when equitable balancing was appropri-
ate and the constitutional limits to a trial court’s equitable discretion 
when statutory violations were alleged, it failed to articulate a “coherent 
theory” for determining remedies in such instances.37 In addition, the 
Court described preliminary injunctions more generally as a remedy that 
involves “commonplace considerations” and “well-established princi-
ples,” never fully defining or explaining how these considerations or 
principles relate to each other.
38
 
                                                                                                             
“incorporate a sliding scale analysis that weighs the four factors against one another”); Kevin J. 
Lynch, The Lock-in Effect of Preliminary Injunctions (forthcoming) (on file with author) (proposing 
a flexible preliminary injunction standard requiring only “serious questions” on the merits). 
 34. See Zygmut J.B. Plater, Environmental Law and Three Economies: Navigating a Sprawling 
Field of Study, Practice, and Societal Governance in Which Everything Is Connected to Everything 
Else, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 361 (1999) (The “first Earth Day galvanized a cadre of attor-
neys, law teachers, law students, and citizens to begin integrating the lessons of environmental 
awareness into the legal system . . . .”); see also Zygmut J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, A Funda-
mental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
981, 983 (1994) (“[E]nvironmental law has developed its complex, extended, doctrinal structure in a 
process dependent upon confrontational, pluralistic citizen activism, operating in every area of gov-
ernance, but particularly in judicial and administrative litigation.”). 
 35. See Michael D. Axline, Constitutional Implications of Injunctive Relief Against Federal 
Agencies in Environmental Cases, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988). 
 36. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944) (stating that the court “balances the con-
veniences of the parties and possible injuries to them according as they may be affected by the grant-
ing or withholding of the injunction” (citation omitted)). 
 37. See Axline, supra note 35 (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation and application of 
equitable discretion and the separation of powers in these three decisions). 
 38. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (using the phrase “common place 
considerations”); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531(1987) (using the phrase “well-
established principles”). 
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Because the Court applied these considerations and principles with-
out much discussion, courts were left with little guidance. Lower courts 
were free to evaluate preliminary injunctions flexibly, emphasizing those 
considerations and principles they deemed most important.
39
 Not surpris-
ingly, confusion and inconsistency emerged.
40
 
A. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill and the Limits to                       
Equitable Balancing 
Interestingly, the most well-known decision addressing an envi-
ronmental preliminary injunction,
 41
 Tenneesee Valley Authority v. Hill,
42
 
is known more for its discussion of statutory interpretation than equitable 
balancing.
43
 In that case, environmental groups sought to enjoin the ac-
tions of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) using the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA).
44
 TVA had almost completed a multi-million dollar 
hydroelectric project, the construction of the Tellico Dam, when a three-
inch fish, the snail darter, was discovered in an area that “would be com-
pletely inundated by the reservoir created as a consequence of the Tellico 
Dam’s completion,”45 thereby destroying the snail darter’s habitat.46 Be-
cause the snail darter was a listed endangered species, its habitat was 
protected under Section 7 the ESA.
47
 Using Section 11(g) of the ESA,
48
 
an environmental group sought “to [permanently] enjoin completion of 
the dam and impoundment of the reservoir” arguing that those actions 
would violate the ESA by directly causing the extinction of the snail 
darter.
49
 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Ten-
nessee denied the request, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
                                                 
 39. See DiSarro, supra note 11, at 75 (discussing three modifications made by federal appellate 
courts to the preliminary injunction standard). 
 40. Axline, supra note 35, at 34; see also Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 526 (noting a “dizzying 
diversity of formulations”). 
 41. See Michael R. Lozeau, Preliminary Injunctions and the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act: The Clean Water Permit Program as a Limitation on the Courts’ Equitable Discretion, 42 
RUTGERS L. REV. 701, 712 (1990) (calling Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill “a landmark decision in envi-
ronmental law”). 
 42. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) [hereinafter TVA]. 
 43. See J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act’s Fall from Grace in the Supreme Court, 36 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 487, 498 (2012) (noting that the “central dispute” in TVA involved a “battle 
of statutory interpretation” between the majority and dissent). 
 44. TVA, 437 U.S. at 156. 
 45. Id. at 161. 
 46. Id. at 162. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Section 11(g) of the ESA allows “any person” to bring a civil action to “enjoin any person 
including the United States . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of the Act.” 16 
U.S.C. § 1536. 
 49. TVA, 437 U.S. at 164. 
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versed this decision explaining “that the District Court had abused its 
discretion by not issuing an injunction in the face of ‘a blatant statutory 
violation.’”50 
On appeal, the Supreme Court analyzed two questions: whether 
completing the dam would violate the ESA; and, if there was a violation 
of the Act, whether an injunction was the appropriate remedy.
51
 To an-
swer the first question, the Court spent considerable time examining the 
language, history, and structure of the ESA and concluded “beyond a 
doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the 
highest of priorities,”52 and “[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting 
this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, 
whatever the cost.”53 The Court explained that “[t]he repeated expres-
sions of congressional concern” over the eradication of endangered spe-
cies “suggest how the balance would have been struck had the issue been 
presented to Congress in 1973.”54 Thus, the Court concluded that com-
pletion of the dam would violate the ESA.
55
 
Having determined that the operation of the Tellico Dam would vi-
olate the ESA, the Court turned to the second question, the requested 
remedy: an injunction. TVA requested that the Court simply issue a rem-
edy “that accords with some modicum of common sense and the public 
weal.”56 In response, the Court explained that general “principles,” in-
stead of “common sense and the public weal,” determine the appropriate 
remedy.
57
 One such principle is that a “federal judge sitting as a chancel-
lor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every viola-
tion of the law.”58 Additionally, while in most cases “the balancing of 
equities and hardships is appropriate,”59 these principles “take a court 
only so far.”60 
The Court recognized the intrinsic limits of a tripartite system of 
government and explained that “[o]nce Congress, exercising its delegat-
ed powers, has decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the 
Executive to administer the laws and for the courts to enforce them when 
                                                 
 50. Id. at 168 (citing the Sixth Circuit’s decision). 
 51. Id. at 172. 
 52. Id. at 174. 
 53. Id. at 184. 
 54. Id. at 186. 
 55. Id. at 193 (“[T]here is an irreconcilable conflict between operations of the Tellico Dam and 
the explicit provisions of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act . . . .”). 
 56. Id. at 194. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 193. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 194. 
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enforcement is sought.”61 Although the Court noted that the burden on 
the public through the loss of millions of dollars could greatly outweigh 
the loss of the snail darter, the Court did not have the authority to make 
such a decision, stating “emphatically” that it did not “[have] the power 
to engage in such a weighing process.”62 Because Congress had already 
decided through the enactment of the ESA that the scales of equity tipped 
in favor of the endangered species, the snail darter, the Court did not bal-




Since this decision, many courts have interpreted TVA v. Hill as 
foreclosing equitable balancing in ESA cases and have refused to engage 
in equitable balancing when an injunction request alleges a violation of 
the ESA.
64
 Others have determined that an alternative preliminary in-
junction standard applies to injunction requests under the ESA.
65
 Some 
scholars, too, have described the TVA v. Hill decision as either “explicitly 
preclud[ing] courts from engaging in traditional equitable balancing in 
determining whether to issue an injunction in the face of a violation of 
the Act”66 or requiring a different standard.67 TVA v. Hill may be useful 
to trial court judges confronted with the occasional injunction request 
alleging an ESA violation; however, in terms of analyzing a preliminary 
injunction based on a violation of NEPA or some other environmental 
statute, TVA v. Hill’s usefulness is limited. 
First, because the Court did not engage in equitable balancing, TVA 
v. Hill did not give federal courts any guidance on how to apply the gen-
eral preliminary injunction principles it discussed. In addition, although 
                                                 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 187–88. 
 63. Id. at 194. (“Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that 
the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities, thereby 
adopting a policy which it described as ‘institutionalized caution.’” (citation omitted)).  
 64. Federico Cheever, Butterflies, Cave Spiders, Milk-Vetch, Bunchgrass, Sedge, Lilies, 
Checker-Mallows and Why the Prohibition Against Judicial Balancing of Harm Under the Endan-
gered Species Act Is a Good Idea, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 313, 316 (1998); see 
also Patrick Parenteau, Citizen Suits Under the Endangered Species Act: Survival of the Fittest, 10 
WIDENER L. REV. 321, 333–34 (2004) (describing cases where district courts have explained that the 
public interest favors the imposition of an injunction in ESA cases). 
 65. See infra Part III (discussing the different standard used with injunctions brought under the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA)). 
 66. See Cheever, supra note 64, at 316; but see Brandon M. Middleton, Restoring Tradition: 
The Inapplicability of TVA v. Hill’s Endangered Species Act Injunctive Relief Standard to Prelimi-
nary Injunctive Relief of Non-Federal Actors, 17 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 318 (2010) (arguing 
for a more narrow interpretation of the ESA). 
 67. See Cheever, supra note 64, at 314 (“[T]he orthodoxy [of TVA] makes sense. The Endan-
gered Species Act . . . cannot tolerate judicial balancing of species harm and economic dislocation 
while still honoring the purpose of the statute-the preservation and recovery of protected species and 
the ecosystems on which they depend.”); see also Parenteau, supra note 64, at 333–34. 
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the Court noted the separation of powers in injunction cases, some schol-
ar’s argue it did not provide a coherent theory for when a court’s equita-
ble powers may be limited.
68
 Sensing that this decision may lead envi-
ronmental plaintiffs to argue that the traditional rules of equitable balanc-
ing do not apply when statutory violations are alleged, the Court clearly 
distinguished TVA v. Hill the next time it addressed an environmental 
preliminary injunction. 
B. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo and Commonplace Considerations 
The next Supreme Court decision involving environmental injunc-
tive relief reviewed the limits to a court’s equitable discretion and further 
discussed the “commonplace considerations” of a court when reviewing 
injunction requests. Decided in 1982, a few years after TVA v. Hill, 
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo
69
 involved the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (FWPCA), which is now the Clean Water Act (CWA). Un-
der both versions of the Act, facilities must obtain a national pollution 
discharge elimination system (NPDES) permit from the Environmental 
Protection Agency before discharging a pollutant, which the Navy had 
failed to do.
70
 Environmental plaintiffs, using the citizen suit provision of 
the FWPCA, sued the Navy for unpermitted discharges.
71
 Characterizing 
the Navy’s conduct as “technical violations” that were not causing any 
“appreciable harm” to the environment, the United States District Court 
for the District of Puerto Rico denied the injunction but ordered the Navy 
to apply for a NPDES permit.
72
 Relying on TVA v. Hill and the position 
that a clear violation of a statute required injunctive relief, the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals vacated the order and remanded with instructions 
for the Navy to cease the violation until it obtained a permit.
73
 On appeal, 
the Supreme Court considered whether the district court was required to 
issue an injunction given the Navy’s failure to comply with the permit 
requirements of the FWPCA or retained discretion to issue other relief.
74
 
As in TVA, the Court noted the limits Congress may place on a 
court’s equitable discretion but cautioned that the Court should not 
“lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established 
principles,”75 including the principle that a court is not “mechanically 
                                                 
 68. See Axline, supra note 35, at 34 (stating that these three decisions failed “to develop clear 
rules of decision for federal courts to apply in later cases”). 
 69. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). 
 70. Id. at 308. 
 71. Id. at 307–08. 
 72. Id. at 309–10. 
 73. Id. at 310. 
 74. Id. at 306–07. 
 75. Id. at 313 (citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)). 
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obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of the law.”76 Alt-
hough the violation of the FWPCA statute was clear, unlike TVA v. Hill, 
the Court considered the failure to get a permit a procedural rather than a 
substantive violation.
77
 Furthermore, the Court noted that the purpose 
and language of the ESA, and not the bare fact of a statutory violation, 




Thus, the Court evaluated FWPCA’s “scheme and purpose” to de-
termine whether equitable discretion was foreclosed.
79
 First, the Court 
noted that unlike the ESA, FWPCA had other means, apart from an in-
junction, to ensure compliance, including a provision for fines and crimi-
nal penalties.
80
 Second, the Court emphasized that the purpose of the 
FWPCA was to maintain “[t]he integrity of the Nation’s waters, . . . not 
the permit process.”81 Upon receipt of the NPDES permit, the Navy 
would be in compliance with the FWPCA. The permitting program thus 
“contemplates the exercise of discretion and balancing of equities mili-
tates against the conclusion that Congress intended to deny courts their 
traditional equitable discretion in enforcing the statute.”82 A final aspect 
of the statutory scheme that suggested courts retained their traditional 
equitable discretion was the statute’s “phased compliance.”83 The 
“scheme of phased compliance” further suggested that FWPCA, unlike 
ESA, was a statute in which Congress “envisioned, rather than curtailed, 
the exercise of discretion.”84 
Based on the Court’s interpretation of the statutory scheme and 
purpose of FWPCA, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that pro-
cedural violations of environmental statutes gave rise to automatic in-
junctions.
85
 Instead, it interpreted FWPCA as not “foreclosing complete-
                                                 
 76. Id. at 313. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 314. (“The purpose and language of the statute limited the remedies available to the 
District Court; only an injunction could vindicate the objectives of the [ESA].”). 
 79. Id. at 314–20. 
 80. Id. at 314. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 316. 
 83. Id. The Court noted that the “ultimate objective of the FWPCA was to eliminate all dis-
charges of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985.” Id. To meet this goal, the statute required the 
use of “best practicable control technology currently available” by July 1, 1977, and the “best avail-
able technology economically achievable” by July 1, 1983. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 320. (“Rather than requiring a district court to issue an injunction for any and all 
statutory violations, the FWPCA permits the district court to order that relief it considers necessary 
to secure prompt compliance with the Act. That relief can include but is not limited to an order of 
immediate cessation.”). 
2013] A Mild Winter 167 
ly the exercise of the court’s discretion.”86 The district court could order 
the relief it considered necessary to secure prompt compliance with the 
FWPCA, including but not limited to an order of immediate cessation.
87
 
The Court’s holding was clear: unlike the ESA, FWPCA did not limit a 
court’s equitable discretion in ordering remedies. 
The Court further described the requested remedy, a preliminary in-
junction, in terms of “commonplace considerations.”88 First, an injunc-
tion is not a “remedy which issues as of course.”89 Rather, injunctions are 
appropriate only where the intervention of a court of equity “is essential 
‘to protect property rights against injuries otherwise irremediable.’”90 
Second, when there are competing claims of injury, the court “balances 
the conveniences of the parties and the possible injuries to them accord-
ing as they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunc-
tion.”91 Third, even when there are instances where irreparable injury 
may result to the plaintiff, an injunction may be postponed if the injunc-
tion will “‘adversely affect a public interest.’”92 
The Court did not apply these considerations beyond noting equita-
ble balancing could “fully protect the range of public interests” at issue.93 
Because a permit was likely to be issued and compliance with FWPCA 
was forthcoming, the balance struck in favor of the Navy. 
Weinberger further highlights the importance of the statute in-
volved and makes clear that the “statutory scheme and purpose,” in con-
junction with the alleged violation, governs whether a court can engage 
in equitable balancing.
94
 However, the Weinberger Court was “unclear 
                                                 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 313. 
 89. Id. at 311 (quoting Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337–38 
(1933)). 
 90. Id. at 312 (quoting Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919)). 
 91. Id. at 312 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944)). Yakus v. United 
States is the first Supreme Court decision to introduce the public interest, albeit in dictum, as a factor 
in evaluating preliminary injunctive relief. See Orin H. Lewis, “The Wild Card That Is the Public 
Interest”: Putting a New Face on the Fourth Preliminary Injunction Factor, 72 TEX. L. REV. 849, 
858 (1994). 
 92. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312 (quoting Yakus, 321 U.S. at 440). 
 93. Id. at 320. 
 94. For further discussion on reconciling traditional equitable discretion with environmental 
statutes see Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions, 45 
U. PITT. L. REV. 513 (1984). Focusing on TVA and Weinberger, Farber argues that courts and schol-
ars have not spent enough time evaluating the duties created by Congress through environmental 
statutes. He explains that when confronted with an injunction alleging a violation of an environmen-
tal statute, a court’s focus “should always be on congressional intent, unclouded by the equity mys-
tique.” Id. at 515. Equitable discretion should only be used when “that intent cannot be discerned.” 
Id. at 545. 
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on the critical issue of the extent of equitable discretion.”95 In addition, 
while the court reiterated a few commonplace considerations, it did not 
explain how to balance these considerations nor did it mention the suc-
cess on the merits factor. Thus, courts continued to develop preliminary 
injunction standards that weighed these commonplace considerations 
differently. 
C. Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell and Well-Established 
Principles 
The final Supreme Court decision before Winter to address envi-
ronmental preliminary injunctions did so in terms of “well-established 
principles.” Like Weinberger, Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gam-
bell
96
 involved a procedural violation of a statute, the Alaska National 
Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), which protects natural re-
sources in Alaska.
97
 Several Alaskan native villages sued under ANILCA 
to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior’s sale of oil and gas leases, arguing 
that the sale would “adversely affect their aboriginal rights to hunt and 
fish on the “Outer Continental Shelf.”98 Much like NEPA, ANILCA re-
quires government agencies to prepare environmental impact statements 
evaluating the potential environmental impacts of a proposed project.
99
 
Although the United States District Court for the District of Alaska 
found that the Secretary of Interior “did not have the policy precepts of 
ANILCA in mind at the time of evaluation” and thus had likely violated 
the Act, it denied the injunction because the balance of the harms did not 
favor the movant and the public interest favored continued oil explora-
tion.
100
 In reversing the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals explained that “[i]rreparable damage is presumed when an 
agency fails to evaluate thoroughly the environmental impact of a pro-
posed action . . . . Injunctive relief is the appropriate remedy for a viola-
tion of an environmental statute absent rare or unusual circumstances.”101 
                                                 
 95. Id. at 523. 
 96. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987). 
 97. Id. at 535. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. at 535 n.2; The relevant portion of ANILCA states: 
In determining whether the withdraw, reserve, lease or otherwise permit the 
use, occupancy or disposition of public lands . . . the head of the Federal 
agency having primary jurisdiction of such land, . . . shall evaluate the effect 
of such use, occupancy, or disposition, . . . the availability of other 
lands . . . and other alternatives. 
ANCILA § 810(a), 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (1980).  
 100. Farber, supra note 94, at 540. 
 101. Id. at 541 (citation omitted). 
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On appeal, the Supreme Court began by reviewing its decision in 
Weinberger. The Amoco Court explained its description of the prelimi-
nary injunction standard in Weinberger as a “review” of “well-
established principles” governing equitable relief in federal courts.102 
One such principle requires the court to “balance the competing claims 
of injury and must consider the effect on each party of granting or with-
holding of the requested relief.”103 The Court reiterated that “particular 
regard should be given to the public interest,” but “‘a federal judge sit-
ting as chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for 
every violation of law.’”104 Finally, the Court echoed Weinberger and 
emphasized the underlying scheme and purpose of the statute by con-
cluding that the district court’s refusal to issue a preliminary injunction 
against all exploration activities did not undermine the purpose of the 
Act: to preserve subsistence resources.
105
 
Unlike Weinberger, the Court in Amoco spent more time analyzing 
these principles of equitable relief. Specifically, the Court noted that the 
injury to subsistence resources from exploration was “not at all proba-
ble.”106 On the “other side of the balance of harms” was the monetary 
loss the oil company petitioners would have experienced “had explora-
tion been enjoined.”107 The implied conclusion was that the balance of 
harms did not tip in favor of the environment. The Court also discussed 
“the important role of the ‘public’ interest in the exercise of equitable 
discretion.”108 In particular, the Court discussed the policy behind 
ANILCA, noting that in ANILCA Congress “expressly declared that 
preservation of subsistence resources is a public interest and established 
a framework for reconciliation, where possible, of competing public in-
terests.”109 Because the Secretary’s action did not undermine ANILCA’s 




D. The Impact of TVA, Weinberger, and Amoco 
While these three Supreme Court decisions set forth important con-
siderations for determining injunctive relief, the decisions did not pro-
vide much guidance on how to balance the various considerations in an 
                                                 
 102. Id. at 542. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982)). 
 105. Id. at 544. 
 106. Id. at 545. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 546. 
 110. Id. 
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injunction request. Left unanswered was whether all the “well-
established principles” or “commonplace considerations” need to be 
evaluated or whether one principle or consideration was more important 
than the others. For instance, the analysis of “public interest” in all three 
decisions arises when discussing whether a statutory violation foreclosed 
a balancing of harms.
111
 Beyond this, how “public interest” should be 
defined or evaluated as a separate factor is not discussed.
112
 Similarly, 
none of the three decisions evaluated “success on the merits” as a sepa-
rate factor, despite the Court’s recognition that a district court must con-
sider whether plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are likely to prevail 
on the merits.
113
 This is surprising given that the Court and scholars treat 
success on the merits as “an important, perhaps the most important, fac-
tor” in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction.114 
The Court’s failure to articulate a clear standard for preliminary in-
junctions and, more importantly, its failure to articulate how the standard 
should be applied resulted in inconsistency and confusion among the dis-
trict courts.
115
 Inconsistency was particularly common in cases involving 
                                                 
 111. See Lewis, supra note 91, at 890 (stating that the court in TVA and Weinberger “merely 
used the public interest as a platform for discussing whether or not a showing of a likely statutory 
violation foreclosed the balancing of harms”). 
 112. See Ryan Griffin, Litigating the Contours of Constitutionality: Harmonizing Equitable 
Principles and Constitutional Values When Considering Preliminary Injunctive Relief, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 839, 845 (2010) (explaining that the Supreme Court has given “scant explanation of how to 
identify situations in which the public interest may override a showing of irreparable harm”). This is 
surprising given circuit court characterizations of this factor as a “wild card” in Lawson Products., 
Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1433 (7th Cir. 1986), and criticism of this factor as one that “may 
disguise and superficially legitimize a judge’s or party’s personal agenda.” Donald B. Haller, Note, 
Granting Preliminary Injunctions Against Dealership Terminations in Antitrust Actions, 67 VA. L. 
REV. 1395, 1403–04 (1981). 
 113. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (“The traditional standard for 
granting a preliminary injunction requires the plaintiff to show that in the absence of its issuance he 
will suffer irreparable injury and also that he is likely to prevail on the merits.”). 
 114. See, e.g., Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83 (2007) (“At the preliminary injunction stage, the 
court is called upon to assess the probability of the plaintiff’s ultimate success on the merits.”); Ash-
croft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (“In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, a 
district court must consider whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are likely to prevail on 
the merits.”) (emphasis added); John Leubsdorf, Preliminary Injunctions: In Defense of the Merits, 
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 35 (2007). In Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009), less than a year 
after Winter, the Court also announced that the first two factors—success on the merits and irrepara-
ble injury—“are the most critical” in requests to stay the enforcement of a judgment pending the 
outcome of an appeal. While a stay is not the same as a preliminary injunction, the Court in Nken 
noted the “overlap” between the four factors considered in both because “similar concerns arise 
whenever a court order may allow or disallow anticipated action before the legality of that action has 
been conclusively determined.” Id. 
 115. See Axline, supra note 35, at 34 (“The Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a coherent 
theory for determining remedies in cases involving statutory violations by federal agencies has cre-
ated confusion and inconsistency in lower court opinions.”). 
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The confusion, however, was not over what principles to evaluate, 
but how to evaluate these principles. For the most part, courts addressed 
the general principles contained in Amoco: irreparable injury, balancing 
the harms, and the public interest. The individual and collective weight 
courts gave these principles varied. In some instances, balancing of 
harms and public interest received cursory treatment, if they were evalu-
ated at all.
117
 In other instances, both likelihood of success on the merits 
and irreparable harm were required for an injunction to issue.
118
 Still in 
other instances, success on the merits and irreparable harm were interre-
lated, and a strong showing of irreparable harm could offset less certainty 
on the success of the merits factor, requiring only a showing of “serious 
questions going to the merits.”119 
This variation, also known as the “sliding scale” or “serious ques-
tions” test, is central to the environmental plaintiff’s argument for a more 
lenient preliminary injunction standard. In some circuits, plaintiffs alleg-
ing environmental harm argued that a different preliminary injunction 
standard applied when “environmental harms” were alleged.120 These 
plaintiffs often quoted the now famous lines from Amoco: “Environmen-
tal injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money 
damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e., irrepa-
rable. If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance of the 
harms will usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the envi-
ronment.”121 Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs in Winter quoted this lan-
guage from Amoco when they argued to the Supreme Court that the dis-
trict court’s finding of a “near certainty” of irreparable harm was plainly 
supported by the record.
122
 
                                                 
 116. For cases, see Eubanks, supra note 20. 
 117. See infra Part III. 
 118. See infra Part III. 
 119. Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
109, 113 (2001) (citation omitted). 
 120. See infra Part III. 
 121. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987). 
 122. Brief for the Respondents at 48, Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,  555 U.S. 7 
(2008) (No. 07-1239). 
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II. WINTER V. NATURAL RESOURCE DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. AND THE 
FOUR-FACTOR TEST 
A. The Winter Decision 
In Winter, environmental organizations including the Natural Re-
source Defense Council (NRDC) challenged the U.S. Navy’s testing of a 
mid-frequency sonar detection system by arguing that this military prac-
tice was harming sea mammals such as whales and dolphins.
123
 The 
NRDC sought to enjoin the Navy from using sonar during its training 
exercises based on alleged violations of NEPA, the ESA and the Coastal 
Zone Management Act (CZMA).
124
 Specifically, the NRDC argued in its 
request for an injunction that there was “the clear potential for significant 
impact” on the marine environment and that the Navy violated NEPA by 
approving the training exercises based only on an Environmental As-
sessment rather than a full Environmental Impact Statement.
125
 
The United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, and the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the injunction.
126
 The Navy ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court and the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision, holding that the District Court abused its discretion by impos-
ing a 2,200–yard shutdown zone and by requiring the Navy to power 
down its MFA sonar during significant surface ducting conditions.
127
 
In reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court, in a 
5–4 decision, rejected the argument that a preliminary injunction is ap-
propriate when there is only a “possibility” of irreparable harm.128 In-
stead, the Supreme Court announced a clear four-factor
129
 test for prelim-
inary injunctions.
130
 Specifically, the Court stated that “[a] plaintiff seek-
ing a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on 
the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
                                                 
 123. Winter, 555 U.S. 7, 15 (2008). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council. 
Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (No. CV06-4131), available at http://docs.nrdc.org/water/wat_060628 
01A.pdf. For a more detailed discussion of the complicated procedural history of Winter, see Lisa 
Lightbody, Comment, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
593, 597–600 (2009). 
 126. Winter, 555 U.S. at 15–17. 
 127. Id. at 15–17, 33. 
 128. Id. at 21. 
 129. Although the Court did not use the term factor at this point, it did use the term “factor” 
later in its opinion. See id. at 32 (“The factors examined above—the balance of equities and consid-
eration of the public interest—are pertinent in assessing the propriety of any injunctive relief . . . .”). 
 130. Colburn, supra note 8, at 321–22 (explaining that in Winter, “the Supreme Court (finally) 
explicitly endorsed [a] four-factored test, perhaps even turning the four factors into elements”). 
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preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that 
an injunction is in the public interest.”131 
The majority, unsurprisingly,
132
 held that the trial court abused its 
discretion in issuing equitable relief because “even if plaintiffs have 
shown irreparable injury from the Navy’s training exercises, any such 
injury is outweighed by the public interest in effective, realistic training 
of its sailors.”133 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in 
part and dissented in part noting that the District Court and Ninth Circuit 
failed to “adequately explain . . . its conclusion that the balance of the 
equities tips in favor of plaintiffs.”134 Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sout-
er, on the other hand, dissented and noted that courts do not require liti-
gants to always show “a particular, predetermined quantum of probable 
success or injury before awarding equitable relief.”135 Instead, “courts 
have evaluated claims for equitable relief on a ‘sliding scale,’ sometimes 
awarding relief based on a lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood 
of success is very high.”136 Justice Ginsburg and Justice Souter conclud-
ed that the NRDC demonstrated “substantial harm to the environment,” 
“almost inevitable success on the merits of its claim,” 137 and that “the 
District Court conscientiously balanced the equities and did not abuse its 
discretion.”138 
                                                 
 131. Winter, 555 U.S. at 19. After setting forth this standard, the Court cited three of its prior 
decisions: Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 692 (2008) (holding that a court must consider the merits 
of an underlying habeas petition before granting a preliminary injunction prohibiting the transfer of 
an American citizen to Iraqi custody), Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–312 
(1982), and Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987). As explained in Part I.B–C., 
the Amoco and Weinberger decisions described the preliminary injunction standard in terms of 
“well-established principles” and “commonplace considerations” rather that the “four-factor” test 
seen in Winter. Similarly, Munaf did not provide a “four-factor” test and instead stated that “[a] 
preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary and drastic remedy’ . . . never awarded as of right. Ra-
ther, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate, among other things, “a likelihood of 
success on the merits.” Munaf, 553 U.S. at 690–91 (citation omitted).  
 132. See Joel R. Reynolds et al., No Whale of a Tale: Legal Implications of Winter v. NRDC, 
36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 753, 753 (2009) (calling the outcome of Winter “hardly revolutionary”). 
 133. Winter, 555 U.S. at 23. 
 134. Id. at 41(Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 135. Id. at 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 53–54. 
 138. Id. at 44. Environmental advocates have relied on Justice Ginsburg’s dissent to argue that 
the sliding-scale language has survived. 
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B. Winter’s Preliminary Injunction Standard Analyzed 
The majority’s analysis of the injunction request in Winter has been 
described as “cursorily,”139 “summarily,”140 and “limited.”141 These cri-
tiques stem from the Court’s brief discussion of the NEPA statute, the 
four preliminary injunction factors, and the relationship between each 
factor. 
Some of the harshest criticisms focus on the Court’s cursory treat-
ment of the alleged statutory violation. Unlike the Court’s decisions in 
TVA, Weinberger, and Amoco where the Court thoroughly analyzed the 
correlating statutes, the Court in Winter gave little thought or acknowl-
edgement of the purpose or objectives of NEPA.
142
 Instead, the Court 
addressed NEPA in a perfunctory manner.
143
 In particular, the Court’s 
unwillingness to examine the merits of the case—whether NEPA was 
violated—allowed the Court in Winter to avoid any serious consideration 
of NEPA or its purposes.
144
 One scholar has noted that “[t]o the majority, 
it appears, NEPA represents nothing more than paper work.”145 And this 
                                                 
 139. Peter Manus, Five Against the Environment, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 221, 225 (2010) (not-
ing that the majority opinion “rested on an all-or-nothing comparison of two dissimilar and only 
cursorily analyzed public interests”). 
 140. Lightbody, supra note 125, at 602 (stating that the Court “summarily concluded” that 
“[t]he public interest in conducting training exercises with active sonar under realistic conditions 
plainly outweighs the [environmental] interests advanced by the plaintiffs”). 
 141. See Manus, supra note 139, at 224 (stating that “the Court considered the outcome of this 
comparison so obvious that it offered little in the way of analysis in its opinion”); see also Susan 
Lee, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: The U.S. Supreme Court Vacates a Prelim-
inary Injunction That Imposed Mitigation Measures on Defense Training, 16 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 
187, 191 (2009) (“[T]he Court’s limited analysis, consisting only of the procedural aspects of the 
preliminary injunction, rather than the plaintiffs’ substantive claim, undermined the policy goal of 
the NEPA to ensure ‘that the agency will not act on incomplete information, only to regret its deci-
sion after it is too late to correct.’” (quoting Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 
(1989))). 
 142. See Manus, supra note 139; Lee, supra note 141. But see Eubanks, supra note 20, at 657 
(stating that the Court in Winter “implicitly” acknowledges the “‘statutory scheme and purpose’ 
approach” to NEPA and that “the Court factored NEPA’s unique scheme and purpose into its pre-
liminary injunction analysis, but it qualified the level of weight accorded to the statutory purpose”). 
 143. In fact, the Court only spent one paragraph discussing what I would call the “scheme and 
purpose” of NEPA when discussing the preliminary injunction standard. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 23 
(majority opinion). 
 144. See Richard Lazarus, The National Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Reappraisal 
and a Peek Behind the Curtain, 100 GEO. L.J. 1507, 1561 (2012) (stating that the “Court relied on 
NEPA’s procedural-only character to justify its ruling” and “never needed to reach the issue whether 
the Navy had in fact violated NEPA”). The majority of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, however, ad-
dresses the underlying merits of plaintiffs’ claims directly noting that “[i]f the Navy had completed 
the EIS before taking action, as NEPA instructs, the parties and the public could have benefited from 
the environmental analysis – and the Navy’s training could have proceeded without interruption. 
Instead, the Navy acted first, and thus thwarted the very purpose an EIS is intended to serve.” Win-
ter, 555 U.S. at 43 (Ginesburg, J., dissenting). 
 145. See Manus, supra note 139, at 242. 
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“brush-off of the statute suggests an almost taunting commentary on its 
purpose.”146 As a result, Winter has been labeled a decision based on the 
“unarticulated personal value system shared by five Supreme Court Jus-
tices.”147 
The Court’s treatment of the individual factors was equally defi-
cient. Although Winter outlined a four-factor standard and stated that the 
plaintiff “must establish” all four factors, the Court did not define or ex-
plain how these factors are demonstrated
148
 or how they relate to one an-
other.
 149
  In fact, the Court’s discussion of these factors does not reflect a 
standard requiring satisfaction of all four factors. For example, after 
clearly stating the four factors of a preliminary injunction, the Court be-
gan its analysis with a summary of the parties’ position and a discussion 
of the second factor, irreparable harm, not the first, success on the mer-
its.
150
 The Court discussed whether the plaintiffs must demonstrate a 
“likelihood” of irreparable injury—not just a possibility—in order to ob-
tain preliminary relief.
151
 Finding the “‘possibility’ standard . . . too leni-
ent,” the Court reiterated that the second factor of the preliminary injunc-
tion standard requires showing that “irreparable injury is likely in the ab-
sence of an injunction.”152 
The Court, however, did not rule conclusively on whether irrepara-
ble harm to plaintiffs was likely, instead stating that “even if plaintiffs 
[had] shown irreparable injury from the Navy’s training exercises, any 
such injury [was] outweighed by the public interest and the Navy’s inter-
                                                 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 224. 
 148. See id. (noting that the two public interests at stake were “broadly” defined). 
 149. See e.g., Amber R. Woodward, The Scope of “Plaintiffs’ Harm” in Environmental Pre-
liminary Injunctions, 88 WASH U.L. REV. 507, 522 (2010) (“In defining the plaintiffs’ harm, the 
Court did not state whether it should consider the harm to the NRDC organizations members, the 
harm to the marine mammals, or the harm to both”); see also John M. Newman, Raising the Bar and 
the Public Interest: On Prior Restraints, “Traditional Contours,” and Constitutionalizing Prelimi-
nary Injunctions in Copyright Law, 10 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 323, 359 (2011) (explaining that 
“neither eBay nor Winter was sufficiently clear on the question of how to apply the new test”); Grif-
fin, supra note 112, at 845 (explaining that in Winter, “the Supreme Court once again failed to pro-
vide a comprehensive standard”). 
 150. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 21 (2008). This is unusual because 
most trial courts begin by discussing success on the merits. An exception to this was the Fourth 
Circuit where before Winter, courts first engaged in a balancing of the “likelihood of irreparable 
harm to the plaintiff, against the likelihood of harm to the defendant.” See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 528 F. Supp. 2d 625, 630 (S.D. W. Va. 2007). If this balance of harm 
favored the plaintiffs, then the court considered the likelihood of success on the merits. Id.; see also 
Montrose Parkway Alt. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 405 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592 (D. Md. 
2005). 
 151. Winter, 555 U.S. at 375. 
 152. Id. 
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est in effective, realistic training of its sailors.”153 Similarly, the Court did 
not analyze whether the first factor—success on the merits—was met,154 
a factor that the district court, the appellate court, and Justice Ginsburg in 
her dissent all concluded weighed in the plaintiffs favor. Rather, the ma-
jority stated that it did “not have to address the lower courts’ holding . . . 
[on] likelihood of success on the merits” because “public interest and the 
Navy’s interest in effective, realistic training of its sailors” weighs 
against granting injunctive relief.
155
 
The Court’s decision thus rests on the last two factors: balancing 
the competing interests of the parties and the public interest.
 156
 Drawing 
from Amoco and Weinberger, the Court describes these factors as “bal-
anc[ing] the competing claims of injury and . . . the effect on each party 
of the granting or withholding of the requested relief”157 and as “the pub-
lic consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of an injunc-
tion.”158 As for balancing the harms, the Court determined that the harm 
to the safety of a Navy fleet if deployed with inadequate training was 
greater than the harm to the unknown number of marine mammals.
159
 
With the final factor, the Court concluded that “the public interest in 
conducting training exercises with active sonar under realistic conditions 
outweighs the [environmental] interests advanced by the plaintiffs.”160 In 
the end, the Court determined that “the balance of equities and considera-
tion of the overall public interest in [the] case tip strongly in favor of the 
Navy.”161 
Because the Court’s analysis focused on the last two factors, it does 
not provide any instruction on how all four factors should be balanced in 
relation to each other.  In addition, the Court did not address whether the 
                                                 
 153. Id. at 376. 
 154. Id. at 381 (“[W]e do not address the underlying merits of plaintiffs’ claims. While we 
have authority to proceed to such a decision at this point, doing so is not necessary here.”). 
 155. Id. at 376. 
 156. Id. at 376–381; see also Del. Dep’t of Natural Res. & Envtl. Control v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, 681 F. Supp. 2d 546, 562 (D. Del. 2010) (acknowledging “the substantial weight accorded 
to the public interest by the Supreme Court in Winter”); Manus, supra note 139, at 225 (noting that 
the majority opinion “rested on an all-or-nothing comparison of two dissimilar and only cursorily 
analyzed public interests”); Stellakis, supra note 21, at 374 (referring to the last two factors as the 
“vastly dominant factors” and the factors on which the Court “hangs its harpoon”). 
 157. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 541 
(1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 158. Id. at 24–25 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 159. Id. at 26. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. Another criticism of Winter involves the standard of review used by the Supreme 
Court. See Reynolds et al., supra note 132, at 765 (“[T]he majority never explicitly measured the 
district court’s factual findings against the well-established standard for appellate review of factual 
findings—that is, whether the court’s findings were clearly erroneous.”). 
2013] A Mild Winter 177 
sliding scale approaches of the Ninth Circuit and other circuits were still 
valid.
162
 This lack of guidance has led to a few unique interpretations of 
Winter. One trial court has stated that the preliminary injunction standard 
only requires consideration of the last two factors. In Wildlands v. U.S. 
Forest Service, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon 
cited Winter when stating that “the court considers [only] the balance of 
equities and the public interest” when determining “whether to issue the 
injunctive relief requested by the plaintiffs.”163 This decision, however, 
appears to be an aberration. 
The more pressing concern is whether the preliminary injunction 
standard is a factor or element test.
164
 Elemental tests and factor tests are 
two different types of inquiries that a court may use to determine whether 
a party has satisfied its burden of proof.
165
 In an element test, a party 
must meet each element to meet its burden of proof.
166
 In contrast, in a 
factor test, each factor does not need to weigh in favor of the party as 
long as some of the factors do.
167
 
This misperception of the standard set forth by the Supreme Court 
in Winter as a more stringent element test is reflected in several subse-
quent decisions. A few trial courts post-Winter treat the preliminary in-
junction standard as an element test. For example, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Texas recently noted after quoting 
the Winter standard that “[t]he plaintiff must satisfy all four require-
ments.”168 In another example, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of California characterized the preliminary injunction 
standard as “the four-element Winter test.”169 Practitioners, too, have ex-
plained the Winter standard as an element test such that the “four factors 
                                                 
 162. Winter, 555 U.S. at 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This Court has never rejected 
[the sliding scale test], and I do not believe it does so today.”). 
 163. Wildlands v. U.S. Forest Serv., 791 F. Supp. 2d 979, 993 (D. Ore. 2011) (citing Winter, 
555 U.S. 7). 
 164. As a legal writing professor, I spend some time in the first semester teaching the differ-
ence between factor tests and element tests. Many legal writing and analysis texts emphasize this 
difference. See DAVID S. ROMANTZ & KATHLEEN ELLIOTT VINSON, LEGAL ANALYSIS: THE 
FUNDAMENTAL SKILL 32–33 (2009); CHRISTINE COUGHLIN ET AL., A LAWYER WRITES 61–63 
(2008). 
 165. ROMANTZ & VINSON, supra note 164, at 32. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Aquifer Guardians in Urban Areas v. Fed. Highway Admin., 779 F. Supp. 2d 542, 564 
(W.D. Tex. 2011) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 21–22 (2008)). 
 169. Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Grantham, No. 2:10-cv-02350-GEB-CMK, 2010 WL 
3958640, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2010). After determining that the plaintiff did not satisfy the first 
factor—likelihood of success—the court determined that it “need not address the three remaining 
Winter factors, i.e. whether Plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of prelimi-
nary relief, the balance of equities tips in their favor, and [the] preliminary injunction is in the public 
interest.” Id. at *15. 
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are not to be balanced against one another, but that each of the four fac-
tors must be met before any injunction may issue.”170 
These varying interpretations of Winter support the complaint that 
the Supreme Court’s analysis of the preliminary injunction standard is 
imprecise. And the treatment of the factors as elements supports the ar-
gument that Winter is more stringent. Under an element standard, envi-
ronmental plaintiffs would be required to satisfy all of the factors—
success on the merits, irreparable harm, balancing, and public interest—
in their favor. Requiring all four “prongs” to be shown separately under 
all circumstances heightens the preliminary injunction standard and in 
effect converts a factor test into an element test.
171
  This lack of guidance 
from the Supreme Court may lead judges to rule how they desire, wheth-
er that be pro-environment or pro-defendant.
172
 This is particularly true 
with the “wild card”173 factor: public interest. 
Juxtaposing these scholarly concerns is the reality: Because of this 
lack of detail, most courts—for the time being—have been able to retain 
their earlier flexible standards.
174
 On the ground, many circuit courts 
have reevaluated their circuit standard in light of Winter, and of those 
circuits, only the Fourth Circuit has stated that Winter overrules its earli-
er preliminary injunction standard.
175
 One circuit, the Second Circuit, has 
expressly stated that Winter does not alter any earlier standard, while 
three circuits, the Third, Seventh, Eighth have implied the same.
176
 Two 
circuits, the Tenth and Ninth Circuits, now apply Winter in conjunction 
with their earlier standards.
177
 
                                                 
 170. Eric J. Murdock & Andrew J. Turner, How “Extraordinary” Is Injunctive Relief in Envi-
ronmental Litigation? A Practitioner’s Perspective, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10464, 
10466 (2012). 
 171. A similar complaint has been made about the U.S. Supreme Court decision eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 338 (2006). See Gergen et al., supra note 29, at 208 (stating that the 
four-factor test for the permanent injunction in eBay “presents its factors as four separately assessed 
prongs, rather than as true ‘factors’—i.e., elements of an overall decision making process that can be 
weighed with or against one another”). 
 172. See Woodward, supra note 149, at 527–28 (stating with regard to the irreparable harm 
factor that “[a] clear standard is necessary because, without it, both parties are unable to properly 
prepare for litigation, and courts are left to their own devices in choosing between outcome-
dispositive standards”). 
 173. Lawson Prods., Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1433 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 174. See infra Part III. 
 175. See infra Part III. 
 176. See infra Part III. 
 177. See infra Part III. 
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III. TESTING THE WATERS: RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS 
A. Research Design 
Many commentators have made sweeping claims about the status of 
preliminary injunctions post-Winter with few data points.
178
 Similarly, 
focusing only on the quantitative results excludes any analysis of the 
content of the trial court orders. This study includes a textual analysis of 
the trial court orders to complement the numerical findings, thereby al-
lowing for a more robust analysis of Winter’s effect.179 
In an effort to better understand what changes Winter may have 
caused to a trial court’s analysis of an environmental preliminary injunc-
tion request, I evaluated six years’ worth of preliminary injunctions is-
sued by federal district courts.
180
  To fall within my data set, the case had 
to be “environmental”; that is, environmental protection or natural re-
source matters were at stake,
181
 and it had to involve a preliminary in-
junction, as opposed to a permanent injunction,
182
 a temporary restrain-
ing order (TRO), or a stay pending appeal.
183
 I further refined my data set 
                                                 
 178. See supra notes 20–22. 
 179. “[D]ata capture[s] votes rather than opinions. For the actual development of the law, the 
opinion matters a great deal.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 65 (2006). 
 180. Using November 12, 2008, the date of the Winter decision, as my starting point, I gath-
ered decisions from online legal research search engines covering the three years before and the 
three years after the Winter decision. My search terms included “preliminary injunction” and “envi-
ronmental harm” or “environmental injury” on Westlaw, WestlawNext, LexisNexis, and LexisNexis 
Advance. These search terms returned an over-inclusive list of cases from which I narrowed the data 
set to include only trial court decisions. 
 181. See Lazarus, supra note 7, at 708 n.4 (describing environmental cases as those cases 
whose “threshold inquiry turns on whether environmental protection or natural resources matters are 
at stake”). 
 182. While the standard for preliminary and permanent injunctions is almost identical, there are 
substantial differences in the application of these standards. See Douglas Laycock, The Death of the 
Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 691–92 (1990) (describing the differences between 
permanent and preliminary injunctions and noting that “[a]lthough the vocabulary of adequate reme-
dy and irreparable injury is common to both preliminary and permanent relief, the competing con-
siderations are quite different at the two stages of litigation”); see also Daniel Mach, Rules Without 
Reasons: The Diminishing Role of Statutory Policy and Equitable Discretion in the Law of NEPA 
Remedies, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 205, 222 n.94 (2011) (stating that “substantial differences exist 
between preliminary and permanent injunctions”). 
 183. While the standards for temporary restraining orders (TROs) and stays pending appeal 
appear similar to preliminary injunctions, they are in fact different. In a TRO, an evaluation of the 
last factor is one-sided—the harm from the issuing of the TRO itself. See 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET 
AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 65.36(1), at 65–83 (3d ed. 2004); see also Cnty. of Los Alomos 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, No. CIV 05-1343 JB/LAM, 2006 WL 1308305, at *7 (D. N.M. Jan. 13, 
2006) (“To obtain a TRO, the moving  y must establish four requirements: (i) a substantial likeli-
hood of success on the merits; (ii) irreparable injury to the movant if the relief is denied; (iii) the 
threatened injury to the movant outweighs the injury to the other party under the TRO; and (iv) the 
TRO, if issued, is not adverse to the public interest.”). Stays, like TROs, are similar but not the same 
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to focus on litigation involving an environmental plaintiff, such as an 
environmental group, seeking an injunction from a governmental entity, 
most often through a citizen suit provision of an environmental statute, 
similar to TVA, Weinberger, Amoco, and Winter.
184
 My final data set 
consists of 74 trial court decisions: 33 were issued in the three years be-
fore Winter, and 41 were issued in the three years after Winter.
185
 
To help better understand whether Winter had altered the way in 
which trial courts approached environmental preliminary injunctions, I 
gathered quantitative and qualitative data from these cases. Together, this 
data provides a more complete evaluation of the changes in environmen-
tal preliminary injunctions since Winter. 
B. Numerical and Textual Results: A Summary 
To summarize the numerical results,
186
 Tables 1 and 2 provide the 
distribution of injunction requests and the types of environmental claims 
involved in these requests. Tables 3 and 4 display the number of injunc-
tion requests granted and denied both overall (Table 3) and by statute 
(Table 4). Tables 5, 6, and 7 include the injunction standard used by trial 
courts and assess any change in the standard used. More specifically, 
                                                                                                             
as preliminary injunctions. In Nken v. Holder, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a stay   
is a type of injunction. Instead, the Supreme Court explained that each is a distinct action. 556 U.S. 
418, 425 (2009). A stay operates on the “judicial proceeding itself” while an injunction “direct[s] the 
conduct of a particular actor.” Id. at 428.  
 184. See Denise E. Antolini, National Park Law in the U.S.: Conservation, Conflict, and Cen-
tennial Values, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 851, 889–90 (2009) (describing the usual 
characteristics of public interest litigation: (1) the lawsuit is directed against the government agency, 
and the resource developer who stands to lose if the suit is successful often intervenes on the side of 
the government; (2) the plaintiffs claim that the agency has violated several federal (and state) stat-
utes; (3) procedural claims are more numerous and more likely to succeed than substantive claims; 
(4) the relief demanded is equitable, obviating the need for jury trials; and (5) the request for a pre-
liminary injunction, often with a companion request for summary judgment, often is the critical stage 
in the litigation) (citing GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, 1 PUBLIC NATURAL 
RESOURCES LAW § 2:10 (2d ed. 2007)); see also Richard J. Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental 
Protection Law in the Supreme Court, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (calling the role of citi-
zen suit enforcement in environmental law “one of environmental law’s essential hallmarks”). I also 
had a few cases involving a state, city, or Indian tribe suing a governmental entity. 
 185. I recognize that I may be missing injunction orders that are not available through on-line 
sources. I also recognize that my evaluation does not take into account those plaintiffs who have 
intentionally avoided pursuing preliminary injunctions post-Winter because of the perceived height-
ened standard. Again, this study is a starting point for assessing Winter’s effect. 
 186. My research looked at the entire population of environmental preliminary injunctions 
issued over a six year period, as opposed to a random sample. For that reason, significance tests were 
not performed. Using the term “statistically significant” in light of the fact that a random sample was 
not used would be misleading because it may implicitly attribute to finding greater scientific im-
portance than it merits. I would note, however, that whether statistical significance tests should be 
applied to population data remains contested. See Scott Phillips, Legal Disparities in the Capital of 
Capital Punishment, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 739 n.66 (2009). 
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Table 5 reports whether trial courts post-Winter cited the standard of 
their circuit, the Winter standard, or some combination of the two, while 
Table 6 records the number of courts referencing the “sliding scale” or 
“serious questions” test. Table 7 adds further information by assessing 
whether the standard articulated post-Winter is a change to the standard 
used pre-Winter. Finally, Table 8 records trial courts’ treatment of the 
public interest factor both before and after Winter. 
In addition to the numerical data, the results include a textual analy-
sis of post-Winter trial court decisions for a more thorough evaluation of 
Winter’s influence.187 Although not every court has confronted Winter, a 
textual analysis of those that have uncovers three approaches to evaluat-
ing preliminary injunction requests post-Winter: apply the Winter stand-
ard, apply the relevant circuit standard, or apply both the Winter and the 
relevant circuit standard. 
C. The Universe of Environmental Preliminary Injunctions 
The first two tables provide background information on the envi-
ronmental injunction requests reviewed for this study. Table 1 provides 
the number of injunction requests ruled on by trial courts in each circuit, 
while Table 2 records the environmental statute involved in the injunc-
tion request. 
Table 1: Distribution of Injunction Requests 
 
Circuit of Trial 
Court Decision 
Pre-Winter Post-Winter 
         First 3 3 
         Second 1 2 
         Third 2 1 
         Fourth 2 1 
         Fifth 1 1 
         Sixth 2 0 
         Seventh 0 1 
         Eighth 1 2 
         Ninth 16 23 
         Tenth 4 3 
         Eleventh 1 1 
         D.C. 1 3 
    Total Number 33 41 
                                                 
 187. I am cognizant of the argument that through the selection of my cases, I somehow created 
a sample, thereby necessitating a statistical analysis. For this reason and the reasons stated above, I 
engaged in a qualitative analysis of the decisions in my data set. 
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Table 2: Types of Claims 
Type of Claim Pre-Winter Post-Winter 
National Environmental Protection Act 
(NEPA) 
28 29 
National Forestry Management Act (NFMA) 6 4 
Clean Water Act (CWA) 6 7 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) 4 10 
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) 2 1 
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) 1 3 
Federal Land Management and Policy Act 
(FLMPA) 
1 4 
Public Nuisance 0 2 
Other: MLA, NMSA, SMCRA, OCSLA, 
LWCFA, and others 
5 8 
 
Table 1 shows an increase in the number of preliminary injunctions 
ruled on after Winter. Specifically, eight more injunctions were ruled on 
during the three years evaluated post-Winter.  Table 1 also shows that 
both before and after Winter, trial courts in the Ninth Circuit evaluated 
the greatest number of preliminary injunction requests with trial courts in 
the Tenth and First Circuits following at a distant second and third. The 
increase in the number of preliminary injunctions reviewed suggests that 
Winter has not discouraged environmental plaintiffs from brining injunc-
tion requests. 
Table 2 shows little change in the statutes involved in environmen-
tal injunction request. Not surprisingly, injunction requests for NEPA 
violations are significantly more than any other environmental statute 
both before and after Winter. The National Forestry Management Act 
(NFMA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA) round out the second and third 
most popular act in injunction requests pre-Winter, but ESA is the second 
most frequent act in injunction requests post-Winter. The increase in the 
number of injunction requests under the ESA may be the result of the 
different standards courts used for evaluating injunction requests for 
ESA violations.
188
 For example, in Center for Biological Diversity v. 
                                                 
 188. Compare Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1167 (D. Mont. 2008) 
(stating that “[t]he third [preliminary injunction] test applies to ESA injunctions. Applying this test, 
the court must still measure the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the possibility of irrep-
arable injury. . . [O]nce likelihood of success and irreparable injury are shown, the court may not 
fine-tune its analysis by weighing the hardships of the parties. This legal principal is a direct ac-
knowledgment of congressional intent. . . . What this means is that if a plaintiff is likely to succeed 
on its ESA claim and irreparable injury is possible, then the court should issue an injunction when it 
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U.S. Forest Service, the United States District Court for the District of 
Arizona noted that the defendant confused the “irreparable harm” stand-
ard from Winter with the “institutionalized caution” standard used in in-
junctions brought under the ESA.
189
 However, not all courts treat prelim-
inary injunctions for ESA violations in the same manner.
190
 
There is also an increase in the number of injunction requests 
brought under public nuisance claims, which may be a result of the re-
turn to public nuisance actions in environmental litigation.
191
 
D. The Outcome of Environmental Preliminary Injunctions 
The next two tables present the outcomes of the preliminary injunc-
tion requests. Table 3 displays the overall results based on three possible 
outcomes of the requests: denied, granted, or granted in part/denied in 
part. Table 4 displays the outcome of the injunction requests based on the 
environmental statute involved. Both tables present the data numerically 
and as a percentage. 
Table 3: Injunctions Overall 
Injunction Outcome Pre-Winter (33) Post-Winter (41) 
Denied 17 22 
Granted 13 12 
In part 3 7 
                                                                                                             
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the ESA.”); see also Florida Key Deer v. Brown, 386 F. 
Supp. 2d 1281, 1284 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (“In cases involving the ESA, the standard is different. Specif-
ically, the third and fourth prongs of the injunction analysis have been foreclosed by Congress.”); 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 820 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D. Ariz. 2011) (“By enact-
ing the ESA, Congress altered the normal standards for injunctions under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65. The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that ‘[t]he traditional preliminary injunction 
analysis does not apply to injunctions issued pursuant to the ESA.’” (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. 
NMFS, 422 F.3d 782, 793 (9th Cir. 2005))). The Supreme Court stated that in enacting the ESA 
“Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been 
struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities.” TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 
194 (1978). “Accordingly, courts may not use equity’s scales to strike a different balance.” Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n, 422 F.3d at 794 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 189. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 820 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1039 (D. Ariz. 
2011). 
 190. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1207 (D. Mont. 2009) (noting 
that Hill “does not command a separate ESA standard when measured by the Court’s ruling in Win-
ter”); see also Defenders of Conewango Creek v. Echo Developers, LLC., No. 06-242E, 2007 WL 
3023927, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2007) (stating the court “will not disregard the traditional analy-
sis” as it rejected the argument that a court of equity is stripped of its usual discretion in cases alleg-
ing a violation of the ESA). 
 191. See Richard O. Faulk, Uncommon Law: Ruminations of Public Nuisance, 18 MO. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2010) (noting the “growth” in public nuisance claims “in climate change and 
environmental litigation, where it seems to be the ‘tort of choice’ for plaintiffs seeking breathtaking-
ly broad relief from global warming and trans-border pollution”). 
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Denied 51.5% 53.6% 
Granted 39.4% 29.3% 
In part 9.1% 17% 
Table 4: Injunctions by Statute 







NEPA Denied: 15 (53.6 %) 
Granted: 12 (42.9%) 
In part: 1 (3.6%) 
Total: 28 
Denied: 16 (55.1%) 
Granted: 11 (34.5%) 
In part: 3 (10.3%) 
Total: 29 
 
NFMA Denied: 3 (50%) 
Granted: 3 (50%) 
In part: 0 
Total: 6 
 
Denied: 3 (75%) 
Granted: 0 
In part: 1 (25%) 
Total: 4 
 
CWA Denied: 4 (66.6%) 
Granted: 2 (66.6%) 
In part: 0 
Total: 6 
Denied: 5 (71.4%) 
Granted: 0 
In part: 2 (28.6%) 
Total: 7 
 
ESA Denied: 2 (50%) 
Granted: 2 (50%) 
In part: 0 
Total: 4 
Denied: 4 (40%) 
Granted: 3 (30%) 




As demonstrated in Table 3, the overall number of injunctions de-
nied has not changed dramatically (51.5% pre-Winter compared to 
53.6% post-Winter—a difference of 2.1%). The number of injunctions 
granted has decreased slightly (39.4% pre-Winter compared to 29.3% 
post-Winter—a difference of 10.1%), but the number of injunctions 
granted in part and denied in part has increased slightly by almost the 
same amount. (9.1% pre-Winter to 17% post-Winter—a difference of 
7.9%). 
A similar trend appears with percentages by statute. Table 4 illus-
trates that the number of NEPA injunctions denied increased by 1.5%, 
the number of injunctions granted decreased by 8.4%, and the number of 
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injunctions granted in part and denied in part increased by 6.7%. The 
numbers in these tables suggest that an injunction is less likely to be is-
sued post-Winter but only slightly so. Again, the percentages suggest that 
Winter has had a mild effect on environmental preliminary injunctions. 
E. The Preliminary Injunction Standard Used: Numerical Results 
Tables 5 and 6 record the standard trial courts employed when re-
viewing preliminary injunctions in environmental cases. Table 5 displays 
the preliminary injunction standard that appears in post-Winter trial court 
decisions, while Table 6 records whether the trial court mentioned an 
alternative sliding scale or serious questions test as part of the prelimi-
nary injunction standard. 
Table 5: Post-Winter: Preliminary injunction standard                              
stated by trial courts 
Standard Number of Trial Courts (41) 
Winter & Circuit Standard 22 
Winter Standard Only 13 
Circuit Standard Only 3 
No Standard 3 
Table 6: Pre- and Post-Winter reference to sliding scale or                    
serious questions 
 
 Pre-Winter (33) Post-Winter (40) 
Sliding Scale or      
Serious Questions Test 
Mentioned 
Total: 20 Total: 23 
60.6% 57.5% 
 
As shown in Table 5, many trial courts state the four-factor stand-
ard from Winter, but most trial courts cite Winter along with their circuit 
standard. This data suggests that while some courts are relying on only 
Winter, more than half of the trial courts confronted with a preliminary 
injunction state the Winter standard in conjunction with their earlier cir-
cuit standard. Table 6 supports the argument that the sliding scale test 
has survived Winter,
192
 but reference to this test has decreased slightly. 
Thus, Winter has a presence, but it does not dominate trial court orders. 
                                                 
 192. Susan Jane Brown & Rachel Fazio, Preliminary Injunctive Relief in the Ninth Circuit 
after Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 37 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 78, 87 (2010), 
available at http://elq.typepad.com/currents/2010/10/currents37-09-brown-2010-1012.html#_edn22 
(remarking that the “sliding scale test remains good law”); see also Jean C. Love, Teaching Prelimi-
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Asserting conclusions based on only the numbers presented in the 
tables shown is problematic. First, the number of injunctions evaluated in 
my data set is small. Second, the time span evaluated is short. Third, an 
evaluation of the number of injunctions granted or denied focuses on the 
results and not on why the results are what they are. A similar problem 
arises if only the number from the standard stated (Table 5) is evaluated, 
as factors can be applied in a variety of ways. Given this reality, I am 
reluctant to rely on the quantitative data alone to argue that Winter had a 
mild effect. Instead, the number of injunctions granted and denied and 
the preliminary injunction standard stated is a starting point for further 
analysis of Winter’s true effect: how the factors are applied. 
F. The Preliminary Injunction Standard Use: The Textual Results 
To answer this “application” question, an evaluation of circuit court 
opinions was required. Seven circuits have confronted Winter with dif-
fering depths of treatment and varying outcomes. From these seven cir-
cuits, three approaches have emerged: (1) expressly state that Winter ap-
plies; (2) expressly state or imply that the circuit standard applies; (3) 
apply Winter with the circuit standard. In addition, two circuits have ex-




1. Expressly State That Winter Applies: The Fourth Circuit  
The first circuit court to discuss its standard in light of Winter is al-
so the only circuit to reject its earlier standard for Winter. Before Winter, 
trial courts in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals used the Blackwelder 
balance-of-hardships test.
194
 Under this analysis, the trial court first “bal-
ance[d] the ‘likelihood’ of irreparable harm to the plaintiff against the 
‘likelihood’ of harm to the defendant.”195 The next step in the test in-
volved looking at the sliding scale between the merits and irreparable 
harm. If the hardship balanced in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff only 
                                                                                                             
nary Injunctions After Winter, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 689, 707–08 (2013) (Professor Love, as a reme-
dies professor, teaches her students that the “door [is] open for the United States Supreme Court to 
approve a federal circuit court’s ‘sliding scale’ test for preliminary injunctions that does not include 
the mere possibility of irreparable harm standard”). 
 193. Both the D.C. and Eleventh Circuits explained that they did not have to decide the correct 
injunction standard in light of Winter. See Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 
1292 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 550 F.3d 1306, 1312 n.10 (11th 
Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 
1101 (2011). 
 194. Moore v. Kempthorne, 464 F. Supp. 2d 519, 525 (E.D. Va. 2006) (quoting Blackwelder 
Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 195 (4th Cir. 1977)). 
 195. Id. 
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had to show that questions raised concerning the merits were “‘so seri-
ous, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them fair ground for 
litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation,’” rather than a like-
lihood of success.
196
 The importance of the merits of the case increased, 
however, as the “probability of irreparable injury diminished.”197 Thus, 
under the Blackwelder preliminary injunction test, the balancing of hard-
ships occurred before a court addressed the question of likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits, and success on the merits was linked to irreparable 
injury in a sliding scale manner. 
After Winter, the Fourth Circuit reevaluated the Blackwelder stand-
ard in a non-environmental case, Real Truth About Obama, Inc., v. Fed. 
Election Committee.
198
 In Real Truth About Obama, the Fourth Circuit 
recognized that the Blackwelder standard stood “in fatal tension” with 
Winter
199
 for four reasons and held that the balancing test established in 
Blackwelder no longer applied.
200
 First, the Fourth Circuit interpreted 
Winter as requiring the plaintiff to “clearly demonstrate that it will likely 
succeed on the merits”201 in all circumstances. Second, the Fourth Circuit 
interpreted Winter as requiring the plaintiff to “make a clear showing that 
it is likely to be irreparably harmed absent preliminary relief,” effectively 
eliminating any balancing or use of a sliding scale.
202
 Third, the court 
noted that Winter “emphasized the public interest requirement,” a factor 
courts did not always evaluate, and now “it must always be consid-
ered.”203 Finally, the Fourth Circuit stated that its earlier standard al-
lowed for a “flexible interplay” of factors in contrast to the four Winter 
requirements, “each of which must be satisfied as articulated.”204 Beyond 
requiring a “clear showing,” the Fourth Circuit did not say by how much 
each factor must be met. But by requiring each factor to be met, the 
Fourth Circuit turned a balancing-factor test into an element test. 
                                                 
 196. Id. (citing Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 195). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2009), 
overruled on other grounds by Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 
2371 (2010).  
 199. Id. at 346. 
 200. Id. The Fourth Circuit was very clear in its position: “[T]he Blackwelder balance-of-
hardship test may no longer be applied in granting or denying preliminary injunctions in the Fourth 
Circuit, as the standard articulated in Winter governs the issuance of preliminary injunctions not only 
in the Fourth Circuit but in all federal courts.” Id. at 347. 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id. (noting a standard that allows for a “possibility of irreparable injury” when there is a 
“strong showing on the probability of success” was “explicitly rejected in Winter”). 
 203. Id.  
 204. Id.; see also McCann, supra note 27, at 49 (stating that “the new Obama standard rigidly 
requires a ‘clear showing’ of each factor independently and deems the failure to make that showing 
as to any single factor fatal to the motion for preliminary injunctive relief” (citation omitted)). 
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The one post-Winter trial court decision from the Fourth Circuit 
evaluating an environmental injunction was issued after the Real Truth 
About Obama and is consistent with this decision. In America White-
water v. Tidwell, the United States District Court for the District of South 
Carolina reviewed a preliminary injunction for an alleged violation of 
several environmental statutes including the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act 
and NEPA.
205
 In its decision, the trial court cited Winter when it restated 
the four factors of the preliminary injunction standard and, in accordance 
with the Real Truth About Obama, marched through an analysis of each 
factor.
206
 After finding that each factor had not been met, the court de-
nied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction.207 
While American Whitewater is the only environmental preliminary 
injunction decision from the Fourth Circuit, subsequent evaluations of 
injunction requests will, like American Whitewater, follow the Real 
Truth About Obama and require that each factor be met. As a result of 
this stricter standard,
208
 future environmental plaintiffs in the Fourth Cir-
cuit will have less success with their injunction requests. For the mo-
ment, this is the only circuit in which this is true. The Fourth Circuit is 
also a circuit that does not valuate very many environmental preliminary 
injunctions,
209
 and its impact on the overall number of injunctions grant-
ed and denied is minor. Fortunately for the environmental plaintiff, all 
the circuits to address Winter have taken approaches different from the 
Real Truth. These circuits have either retained or reconciled their earlier 
standards with Winter or have avoided the issue all together. 
2. Expressly State or Imply the Circuit Standard Applies 
a. Expressly State the Circuit Standard Applies: The Second Circuit 
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, when 
confronted with a preliminary injunction, clearly evaluated its standards 
in light of Winter. The Second Circuit, however, reached the opposite 
conclusion. Like trial courts in the Fourth Circuit, trial courts in the Sec-
ond Circuit before Winter used a sliding scale approach to weigh the pre-
liminary injunction factors. The most common standard stated was a 
three-part test requiring the plaintiff to establish: (1) irreparable harm; (2) 
either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious 
                                                 
 205. Am. Whitewater v. Tidwell, No. 8:09-cv-02665-JMC, 2010 WL 5019879 (D. S.C. Dec. 2, 
2010). 
 206. Id. at *10. 
 207. Id. at *10–14. 
 208. In fact, in Real Truth About Obama, the Fourth Circuit noted that Winter requirements 
were “far stricter” than the Blackwelder requirements. Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 347. 
 209. See supra Part III (showing the distribution of environmental preliminary injunctions). 
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questions going to the merits to make them fair ground for litigation; and 
(3) a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in its favor.
210
 
After Winter, the Second Circuit addressed the viability of this 
standard in Citigroup Global Markets v. VCG Special Opportunities 
Master Fund.
211
 In Citigroup, the Second Circuit noted that the Supreme 
Court in Winter “expressly withheld any consideration of the merits of 
the parties’ underlying claims.”212 The Second Circuit interpreted this 
silence to mean that the Supreme Court had not foreclosed application of 
the “serious question” standard.213 Thus, the Second Circuit held that its 
earlier flexible standard “remain[ed] valid.”214 
Only two trial courts in the Second Circuit have addressed envi-
ronmental preliminary injunctions post-Winter. Both stated the four fac-
tors from Winter. One trial court mentioned that the Second Circuit’s 
serious question standard survives,
215
 while the other did not.
216
 There-
fore, no clear trend has emerged. By citing Winter, trial courts in the 
Second Circuit have signaled that Winter has a role, but that role is lim-
ited to identifying the preliminary injunction factors. 
b. Imply That the Circuit Standard Survives: The Third, Seventh, and 
Possibly Eighth Circuits 
A third approach is to imply that an earlier circuit standard applies. 
Unlike the Second Circuit, which clearly stated that the “serious ques-
tion” standard remains valid after Winter, the Third, Seventh, and possi-
bly the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals have subtly suggested that their 
circuit standards survive. 
i. The Third Circuit 
Before Winter, trial courts in the Third Circuit used a traditional 
four-factor test balancing all four factors against each other.
217
 In the one 
post-Winter environmental preliminary injunction request from a trial 
court in the Third Circuit, the Delaware Department of Natural Re-
                                                 
 210. Sadler v. Mineta, No. 3:05-CV-1189 (MRK), 2006 WL 2772699, at *18 (D. Conn. Sept. 
26, 2006) (citing Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 331 F.3d 342, 348–49 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 211. Citigroup Global Markets v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund, 598 F.3d 30 (2d 
Cir. 2010). 
 212. Id. at 37. 
 213. Id. at 38. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Habitat for Horses v. Salazar, 745 F. Supp. 2d 438, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
 216. City of Newburgh v. Sarna, 690 F. Supp. 2d 136, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
 217. Defenders of Conewango Creek v. Echo Developers, LLC., No. 06-242E, 2007 WL 
3023927, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2007) (citing Clean Ocean Action v. York, 57 F.3d 328, 331 (3d 
Cir. 1995)); see also FiberMark N. Am., Inc. v. Jackson, CIV. A. 07-839 (MLC), 2007 WL 4157235 
(D. N.J. Mar. 28, 2007). 
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sources and Environmental Control sought to enjoin the United States 
Army Corp of Engineers from a river deepening project, under the Clean 
Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Coastal Zone Management Act.
218
 
The trial court cited Winter instead of the Third Circuit when stating the 
four-factor preliminary injunction standard.
219
 The court then evaluated 
each of the factors, finding that the first two weighed against the injunc-
tion.
220
 With the final two factors, the court briefly balanced the envi-
ronmental preservation efforts against the economic interests and con-
cluded that it was in the public interest to proceed with the deepening 
project.
221
 The trial court, therefore, denied the injunction request.
222
 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ treatment of Winter is con-
sistent with the trial court’s approach. In Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. 
Forest Service, a mineral rights group sought to enjoin the Forest Service 
from implementing a policy that would have prevented the owners from 
drilling in the national forest until the completion of an EIS.
223
 The min-
eral-rights owner moved for a preliminary injunction and the injunction 
was granted.
224
 The trial court noted that, according to the Third Circuit’s 
four-factor standard, the movant bears the burden to demonstrate that all 
four factors favor preliminary relief.
225
 These factors, however, are bal-
anced so that if the arguments for one factor are particularly strong, an 
injunction may issue even if the arguments in other areas are weak.
226
 
The court also explained that in the Third Circuit, “if a plaintiff demon-
strates both a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable injury, it 
almost always will be the case that the public interest will favor the 
plaintiff.”227 After determining that all the factors weighed in the mineral 
owners’ favor, the district court issued the injunction. 
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision after 
evaluating the same four factors.
228
 When stating the preliminary injunc-
tion standard, the Third Circuit cited its four-factor standard
229
 and cited 
                                                 
 218. Del. Dep’t of Natural Res. & Envtl. Control v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 681 F. Supp. 
2d 546, 554 (D. Del. 2010). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 558–62. 
 221. Id. at 563. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 09-125, 2009 WL 4937785, at *23 (W.D. 
Pa. Dec. 15, 2009). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at *33 (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 
1421, 1427 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 228. Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 229. Id. at 250 (citing Kos Pharm. Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
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Winter only once, when noting that the public interest analysis may 
change when military interests are involved.
230
 This treatment by the 
Third Circuit of its standard and Winter implies that the Third Circuit 
standard survives. In the Third Circuit, a four-factor standard where all 
the factors are balanced against each other is not viewed to be in conflict 
with Winter. 
ii. The Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit standard, which treated success on the merits 
as a threshold factor, appears to be valid post-Winter as well. In the Sev-
enth Circuit, a movant was required to make a threshold showing that 
demonstrated (1) some likelihood of succeeding on the merits and that it 
has “no adequate remedy at law” and (2) it will suffer “irreparable harm” 
if preliminary relief is denied.
231
 If the moving party could not meet these 
requirements, the injunction was denied.
232
 If, however, the movant pre-
vailed, the court then considered (3) the irreparable harm the non-moving 
party will suffer if preliminary relief is granted, balancing that harm 
against the irreparable harm to the moving party if relief is denied and 
(4) the public interest, meaning the consequences of granting or denying 
the injunction to non-parties.
233
 Furthermore, these factors were applied 
on a “sliding scale” approach, under which “the more likely it is the 
plaintiff will succeed on the merits, the less the balance of irreparable 
harms need weigh towards its side.”234 
This sliding scale standard appears to survive Winter.
235
 The one 
trial court decision to evaluate a preliminary injunction post-Winter in-
volved a public nuisance claim that alleged that the potential entry of 
Asian carp into Lake Michigan posed a public nuisance.
236
 In Michigan 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, several states sought an injunction to 
prevent the emigration of Asian carp through the Chicago Area Water-
ways System into Lake Michigan.
237
 After applying the Seventh Circuit 
standard, the United States District Court for the Northern District Court 
                                                 
 230. Id. at 256 (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008)). 
 231. Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 11–12. 
 234. Id. at 12. 
 235. See Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 2010) (where the Seventh Circuit, after 
reciting the Winter standard, remarked that “[t]hese considerations are interdependent: the greater 
the likelihood of success on the merits, the less net harm the injunction must present in order for 
preliminary relief to be warranted”). 
 236. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10-CV-4457, 2010 WL 5018559 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 2, 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635 
(2012). 
 237. Id. at *1. 
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of Illinois denied this request.
238
 The trial court cited the Seventh Circuit 
threshold and sliding scale standard but added that Winter clarified that 
the irreparable harm must be likely.
239
 Because the plaintiffs did not 
show sufficient likelihood of success on the merits or a sufficient pro-




On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court’s decision denying the injunction because it found the balance 
of harms favored the defendants.
241
 The Seventh Circuit stated the four-
factor preliminary injunction standard for Winter and analyzed each of 
the factors, but it continued to refer to the irreparable harm factor as a 
threshold requirement.
242
 The Seventh Circuit did not comment on the 
trial court’s reference to the sliding scale approach.243 
In another post-Winter decision, the Seventh Circuit, in reference to 
the first factor, stated that there must be “a plausible claim on the mer-
its.”244 Although the Seventh Circuit cited Winter, it did not analyze the 
validity of its standard post-Winter. Instead, it stated that the strength of 
the first factor depends on the remaining factors: “[T]he more net harm 
an injunction can prevent, the weaker the plaintiff’s claim on the merits 
can be while still supporting some preliminary relief.”245 Thus, the slid-




iii. The Eighth Circuit 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has offered a similar implied 
endorsement of its earlier standard. Before Winter, two standards existed 
in the Eighth Circuit: a four-factor standard and an “alternative” standard 
that allowed an injunction based on either “(1) probable success on the 
merits and possible irreparable injury, or (2) sufficiently serious ques-
tions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and 
                                                 
 238. Id. at *2. 
 239. Id. at *13. 
 240. Id. at *2. 
 241. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 1635 (2012). 
 242. Id. at 787. 
 243. Id. at 782–90. 
 244. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 
(7th Cir. 2009). 
 245. Id. 
 246. See Bates, supra note 3, at 1543; Weisshaar, supra note 11 at 1037. Also, in Alliance for 
the Wild Rockies, 622 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit noted that the Seventh 
Circuit has held that its earlier standard continues to apply. See infra notes 283–288 and accompany-
ing text. 
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balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting pre-
liminary relief.”247 In Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers, an environmental organization sued the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and an electric utility alleging the 
process for permitting the construction of a new coal-fired power plant 
violated the CWA, NEPA, and the ESA.
248
 The trial court granted the 
injunction request and the utility appealed, arguing that the court “‘erred 
with respect to each’ of the four requirements for preliminary injunctive 
relief cited by the Supreme Court.”249 Specifically, the utility took issue 
with the language used by the trial court to describe each factor.
250
 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit did not recite a preliminary injunction 
standard from Winter or the Eighth Circuit.
251
 Instead, it launched into an 
analysis of success on the merits and continued by analyzing the trial 
court’s decision on the remaining three factors.252 Although the trial 
court used phrases such as “at the very least,” “fair ground for litigation,” 
and “serious issues” similar to the “alternative standard” that existed in 
the Eight Circuit before Winter,
253
 the Eighth Circuit held that “any error 
by the district court in the wording of its order [was] harmless.”254 It was 
clear from the court’s order that the trial court was familiar with Win-
ter.
255
 In addition, the parties discussed Winter extensively, and the 
Eighth Circuit found no reason to believe that the court overlooked any 
part of this standard.
256
 
No trial court in the Eighth Circuit has addressed an environmental 
preliminary injunction post-Winter, so it is difficult to confidently state 
what change has occurred. Practitioners, however, have criticized the 
Sierra Club decision for “not faithfully apply[ing] the Winter standard in 
substance,”257 noting that some “federal courts of appeal persist in apply-
ing more relaxed or ‘flexible’ standards.”258 So, from a practitioner 
standpoint, the Eighth Circuit’s flexible factor standard remains intact 
post-Winter. 
                                                 
 247. Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 112 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 248. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 645 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 249. Id. at 989. 
 250. Id. at 990. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 992 (noting that the trial court “used wording once familiar”). 
 254. Id. at 994. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See Murdock & Turner, supra note 170, at 10470. 
 258. Id. at 10474. 
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3. Apply Winter with the Circuit Standard: Ninth and Tenth Circuits 
Less certainty exists in the viability of the standards of the Ninth 
and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals post-Winter. Before Winter, the 
Tenth Circuit used the same four factors stated in Winter.
259
 The Tenth 
Circuit, however, relaxed the first factor, success on the merits when the 
moving party established that the three remaining factors tipped decided-
ly in its favor.
260
 In such circumstances, the movant “need only show 
questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubt-
ful as to make them a fair ground for litigation.”261 
a. The Tenth Circuit 
After Winter, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a man-
datory preliminary injunction in RoDa Drilling and noted that the Winter 
standard was a “heightened standard.”262 However, the Tenth Circuit 
cautioned that the heightened standard applied only to those preliminary 
injunctions that are disfavored: preliminary injunctions that alter the sta-
tus quo, mandatory preliminary injunctions, and preliminary injunctions 
that give the movant all the relief it would be entitled to if it prevailed in 
the full trial.
263
  Thus, when the San Luis Valley Ecosystem Council re-
quested a mandatory preliminary injunction for an alleged NEPA viola-
tion, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado stated 
both the Winter standard and the earlier Tenth Circuit standard stated in 
Lundgrin.
264
 In a footnote, the trial court noted that while the United 
States Supreme Court “made clear in Winter that all four elements must 
be established to justify issuance of a preliminary injunction,” in certain 
circumstances the Tenth Circuit “appears to recognize the continuing 
validity of the modified success-on-the-merits formula notwithstanding 
the Winter decision.”265 
                                                 
 259. See Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 08-cv00462-REB-MEH, 
2008 WL 1946818, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 30, 2008) (citing Lundgrin v. Clayton, 619 F.2d 61, 63 
(10th Cir. 1980) for the following standard: “A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show (1) 
a substantial likelihood that the movant eventually will prevail on the merits; (2) that the movant will 
suffer imminent and irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; (3) that the threatened injury to 
the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and 
(4) that the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest.”). 
 260. Id. at *2. 
 261. Id. (citing Nova Health Sys. v. Edmondson, 460 F.3d 1295, 1298 n.10 (10th Cir. 2006)). 
 262. RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208–09 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that the 
movant seeking a mandatory preliminary injunction post-Winter is required “to make a heightened 
showing of the four factors”). 
 263. Id. at 1208 n.3. 
 264. San Luis Valley Ecosystem Council v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 
1239 (D. Colo. 2009). 
 265. Id. (citing RoDa Drilling, 552 F.3d at 1208 n.3). 
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When it came time to apply the preliminary injunction factors, the 
district court addressed all “four prongs,”266 saving the likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits for last. Having found that the first three factors 
weighed in the plaintiff’s favor, the court applied the modified test on the 
likelihood of success factor.
267
 The court held that the plaintiff had at 
least raised questions going to the merits, which was sufficient when the 
plaintiff had established the other three factors in its favor.
268
 Thus, de-
spite the “clear” statement from the Supreme Court that all factors must 
be met, the trial court exercised its discretion in determining how the fac-
tors were met. 
More recently, the United States District Court for the District of 
Kansas recognized the continuing validity of the Tenth Circuit’s modi-
fied test while applying both the Winter and Tenth Circuit standards. In 
Hillsdale Environmental Loss Prevention, the trial court denied an in-
junction pending appeal and TRO request for alleged NEPA and CWA 
violations after analyzing the request under both the Winter standard and 
the Tenth Circuit standard.
269
 The trial court again noted in a footnote 
that the Supreme Court in Winter “did not specifically address the modi-
fied test for the ‘likelihood of success’ factor” and therefore “neither re-
jected the modified test nor endorsed it.”270 Citing RoDa Drilling and 
San Luis Valley, the court recognized that it was “bound by Tenth Circuit 
precedent, which appears to recognize the continuing validity of the 
modified test post-Winter.”271 
Based on these decisions, the trial court applied both tests and held 
that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the first factor under both the modified 
Tenth Circuit test and the Winter test.
272
 More specifically, the plaintiffs 
failed to show a “likelihood of success on the merits” and failed to show 
“questions going to merits so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful, 
as to make the issues ripe for litigation and deserving of more deliberate 
investigation.”273 The court noted that the plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy the 
first factor under either standard was sufficient for the court to deny the 
                                                 
 266. Id. at 1239. 
 267. Id. at 1242–46. 
 268. Id. at 1243. 
 269. Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10-CV-2008 
CM/DJW, 2011 WL 3847383 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2011). 
 270. Id. at *1 n.1. 
 271. Id. (citing RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 12009 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009); San 
Luis Valley Ecosystem Council, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 n.1). 
 272. Id. at *1 (“In this case, plaintiffs failed to satisfy the first factor under either standard, 
which means injunctive relief—even for seven days—is not warranted.”). 
 273. Id. at *2. 
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current relief.
274
 Nonetheless, the court evaluated the final injunction fac-
tors and noted that neither weighed in the plaintiffs’ favor.275 
b. The Ninth Circuit 
Before Winter, trial courts in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
could employ one of two tests. Under the “traditional test,” the plaintiff 
had to show the same four factors from Winter.
276
 Under the “alternative 
test,” the plaintiff could establish “either a combination of probable suc-
cess on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm or that serious 
questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his fa-
vor.”277 The two formulations of the alternative test represent a sliding 
scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm increased as the 
probability of success decreased.
278
 
Before the Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to address Winter, trial 
courts in the Ninth Circuit questioned whether this alternative “sliding-
scale” test survived.279 
The Ninth Circuit, too, is divided on whether the sliding scale 
standard continues to apply. In the Ninth Circuit’s first post-Winter deci-
sion, Earth Island Institute v. Carlton, it reviewed a decision denying an 
injunction pending appeal for an alleged violation of NFMA and 
NEPA.
280
 Although the Ninth Circuit did not comment on the trial 
court’s assertion that “there is no longer a viable sliding scale test,”281 it 




In contrast, the Ninth Circuit explicitly analyzed its earlier standard 
in light of Winter in Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell.
283
 Alliance 
                                                 
 274. Id. at *3. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 277. Id. 
 278. Berryessa for All v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, No. C 07-259 SI, 2007 WL 4209551, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2007) (noting that a plaintiff can demonstrate it is entitled to preliminary 
relief “in two ways”). 
 279. Compare Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, No. CIV.S-09-2020FCD-EFB, 2009 WL 2905801, 
at *1 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2009) (noting that “contrary to plaintiff’s continued protestations, Win-
ter represents the sole, controlling standard for preliminary injunction relief. There is no longer a 
viable, alternative sliding-scale test . . . .”), with Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Grantham, No. 
2:10-cv-02350-GEB-CMK, 2010 WL 3958640 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2010), aff’d sub nom. Klamath 
Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Grantham, 424 F. App’x 635 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s “‘serious questions’ approach survives Winter when applied as part of the four-element Winter 
test”). 
 280. See Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 281. Earth Island Inst., 2009 WL 2905801, at *1 n.2. 
 282. Earth Island Inst., 626 F.3d at 476. 
 283. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011). 
2013] A Mild Winter 197 
for the Rockies involved a timber sale that allegedly violated of NEPA 
and NFMA.
284
 The United States District Court for the District of Mon-
tana applied Winter as an element test and denied the injunction because 
the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, nor 
that irreparable injury was likely in the absence of an injunction.
285
 
In reversing this decision, the Ninth Circuit evaluated what other 
circuit courts had done in light of Winter and recognized that the Su-
preme Court did not expressly overrule the sliding scale test.
286
 In light 
of this, the Ninth Circuit held that the serious question standard survives 
but that the other factors of Winter must also be met.
287
 Therefore, the 
“serious questions” test “survives . . . when applied as part of the four-
element Winter test.”288 The standard from Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 
as opposed to Earth Island Institute, has taken hold in the trial courts of 
the Ninth Circuit. Most trial courts list the four factors from Winter fol-
lowed by the language from Alliance that the serious questions standard 




4. Apply the Circuit Standard When the Circuit Court Is Silent: Trial 
Courts in the First, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits 
Several circuit courts have not yet addressed Winter. For trial courts 
in these circuits, the trend appears to follow their established circuit 
standard rather than adopt Winter. 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals’ earlier standard included all 
four factors, but trial courts placed the greatest emphasis on the first fac-
tor, success on the merits. If the plaintiff could not demonstrate that “he 
is likely to succeed on his quest, the remaining factors [became] matters 
                                                 
 284. Id. at 1130. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 1131, 1134 (reviewing at the Fourth, Seventh, and Second Circuits’ standard and 
joining with the Seventh and Second Circuits “concluding that the ‘serious questions’ version of the 
sliding scale test for preliminary injunctions remains viable after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Winter”). 
 287. Id. at 1134–35. 
 288. Id. at 1131–32. 
 289. Save the Peaks Coal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV-09-8163-PCT-MHM, 2011 WL 
671766, at *2 n.1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2011). After quoting the Winter standard, the trial court noted in 
a footnote that “[i]n the alternative, the moving party may show, ‘serious questions on merits.’” See 
Los Padres Forestwatch v. U.S. Forest Serv., 776 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2011); 
Conservation Congress v. U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (E.D. Cal. 2011); W. Watersheds 
Project v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 774 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1093 (D. Nev. 2011), aff’d, 443 F. App’x 
278 (9th Cir. 2011); Bair v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., No. C 10-04360 WHA, 2011 WL 2650896 (N.D. 
Cal. July 6, 2011); W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 (DMG), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 151556 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011). 
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of idle curiosity.”290 However, even upon a finding that the first factor 
had not been met, trial courts often evaluated the remaining factors.
291
 
This practice remains in place after Winter. Trial courts give cre-
dence to Winter by citing the decision for certain principles, such as pre-
liminary injunctions are an extraordinary remedy, but restate the prelimi-
nary injunction standard from the First Circuit. Furthermore, when it 
comes to applying the standard, trial courts continue to place emphasis 
on the first factor and address the remaining factors for completeness 
sake.
292
 Thus, there appears to be no change in the approach taken by 
trial courts in the First Circuit when reviewing preliminary injunctions. 
There also appears to be little change in the approach taken by trial 
courts in the D.C. and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals. Before Winter, the 
D.C. Circuit employed a version of the sliding scale standard where all 
four factors had to be balanced against one another; it placed particular 
emphasis on irreparable injury.
293
 After Winter, the trial courts presented 
with environmental preliminary injunctions have cited Winter, but they 
continue to view the four factors as a “continuum, with more of one fac-
tor compensating for less of another,” requiring “at least some injury” for 
an injunction to issue.
294
 The D.C. Circuit has addressed Winter in non-
environmental injunction requests and noted that Winter “could be read 
to create a more demanding burden” than the sliding-scale analysis.295 
However, the court did not resolve whether the “sliding-scale analysis 
survives” Winter because the injunction being reviewed could have been 
denied under either approach.
296
 
                                                 
 290. Nw. Bypass Group v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 470 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36 (D. N.H. 2007) 
(quoting Weaver v. Henderson, 984 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
 291. Id. at 63 n.49 (“Having concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to demon-
strate a reasonable likelihood of success, the Court need not proceed any further. For the sake of 
completeness, the Court will evaluate the remaining three prongs.”); see also Food & Water Watch, 
Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 570 F. Supp. 2d 177, 184 (D. Mass. 2006) (stating that “the first 
two factors—likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm—are threshold issues,” which 
did not weigh in movant’s favor, but evaluated the remaining two factors nonetheless); Sierra Club 
v. Wagner, Civil No. 07-cv-257-SM, 2008 WL 3823700 (D. N.H. Aug. 15, 2008) (noting the im-
portance of the first factor but evaluating all four factors). 
 292. Phippsburg Shellfish Conservation Comm’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 800 F. Supp. 
2d 312, 323 (D. Me. 2011). After resolving the “first and most important injunction criterion against 
the Plaintiff,” the court noted that it “could stop here. However for the sake of completeness,” the 
court addressed the remaining three injunction criteria. Id. at 326; see also Friends of Merrymeeting 
Bay v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 810 F. Supp. 2d 320, 322 (D. Me. 2011) (addressing all four factors 
but noting that likelihood of success on the merits is the “most important part of the preliminary 
injunction assessment”). 
 293. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 525 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing 
Davenport v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, 166 F.3d 356, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
 294. In Def. of Animals v. Salazar, 675 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 295. Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 296. Id. 
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In contrast to the D.C. Circuit, the Fifth Circuit’s pre-Winter stand-
ard required all four factors to be met.
297
 The only post-Winter environ-
mental preliminary injunction request within the Fifth Circuit arose in the 
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. That trial court in-
terpreted Winter as requiring the plaintiff to “satisfy” all four require-
ments.
298
 These similar pre-and-post-Winter approaches suggest that 
Winter has not had a dramatic effect in the Fifth Circuit. 
5. Not Enough Information to Make a Conclusion: The Eleventh and 
Sixth Circuits 
Before Winter, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, similar to 
other circuits, allowed for a lesser showing of the first factor, serious le-
gal question present as opposed to likelihood of success on the merits, 
but only when the other three factors heavily tilted in favor of an injunc-
tion.
299
 Whatever standard employed, a trial court was required to make 
“individualized judgments” of each factor.300 In the only post-Winter en-
vironmental preliminary injunction request to arise in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 
did not mention the “serious questions” approach as an alternative to 
evaluating injunction requests.
301
 The court also did not mention a four-
factor test or the factors that must be evaluated when reviewing a re-
quest.
302
 Instead, the trial court cited Winter when stating that the plain-
tiff must show that irreparable harm is “likely” and when pointing out 
that the Supreme Court emphasized the harm to marine mammals as be-
ing weighed against national interest.
303
 The court ultimately denied the 
injunction request, focusing on the failure of the plaintiff to demonstrate 
that irreparable harm was likely in the absence of an injunction.
304
 
In addition, like the D.C. Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit has avoided 
weighing in on Winter. The one Eleventh Circuit decision discussing a 
preliminary injunction noted that because it found a preliminary injunc-
                                                 
 297. Blanco v. Burton, No. Civ.A. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 14, 2006) 
(stating all four factors and requiring that the “movant, by a clear showing, carr[y] a burden of per-
suasion); see also Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 371 (5th Cir. 2008) (requiring that the 
plaintiff carry “the burden of persuasive on all four requirements”). 
 298. Aquifer Guardians in Urban Areas v. Fed. Highway Admin., 779 F. Supp. 2d 542, 564 
(W.D. Tex. 2011). 
 299. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Nos. 3:05-cv-362-J-32TEM, 3:05-cv-459-J-
32TEM, 2007 WL 402830, at *1 (M.D. Fl. Feb. 1, 2007) (citing Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 
1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
 300. Id. 
 301. Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. at 1323–34. 
 304. Id. at 1327. 
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tion unwarranted, it “need not address . . . the correct equitable standard 
for a district court to apply in awarding an injunction . . . in light of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision . . . in Winter.” 305 This limited commen-
tary is not enough to reach a conclusion on Winter’s effect in the Elev-
enth Circuit. 
I am also unable to make a conclusion about changes in the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals because there were no environmental injunction 
cases to come out of this circuit in the three years post-Winter. I can only 
note that the Sixth Circuit before Winter used a “four factor balancing 
test” when considering whether to grant a request for injunction relief.306 
A summary of these results appear in the following chart. The over-
all results in those circuit courts that have addressed their preliminary 
injunction standard in light of Winter show that only one circuit—the 
Fourth Circuit—has overruled its pre-Winter standard. The Ninth and 
Tenth Circuits have modified earlier standards, three circuits have im-
plied that earlier standards continue, while one circuit—the Second Cir-
cuit—has expressly held that its pre-Winter standard remains valid.307 
Table 7: Summary pre- and post-Winter Injunction Standards Trial 









First Denied: 3  
Granted: 0 
In part: 0 
Total: 3 
Denied: 2  
Granted: 0 




No change in 
trial courts. 
Second Denied: 1  
Granted: 0 
In part: 0 
Total: 1 
 
Denied: 2  
Granted: 0 

















                                                 
 305. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 550 F.3d 1306, 1312 n.10 (11th Cir. 2008), 
abrogated on other grounds by CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101 (2011). 
Norfolk, however, is a non-environmental case. 
 306.  Heartwood, Inc. v. Peterson, No. 07-144-KSF, 2008 WL 2151997, at *7 (E.D. Ky. May 
21, 2008) (citing Performance Unlimited, Inc. v. Questar Publishers, Inc., 52 F.3d 1373, 1381 (6th 
Cir. 1995)).  
 307. See infra Part III for further analysis of these results. 






Third Denied: 1  
Granted: 1  





















still applies.  
Fourth Denied: 1  
Granted: 1  
In part: 0 
Total: 2 
 
Denied: 1  
Granted: 0 



















Fifth Denied: 1  
Granted: 0 
In part: 0 
Total: 1 
Denied: 1  
Granted: 0 
In part: 0 
Total: 1 
All four fac-
tors must be 
met. 
No change in 
trial courts. 
Sixth Denied: 1 
Granted: 1 












Seventh Denied: 0 
Granted: 0 
In part: 1  
Total: 1 
 
Denied: 1  
Granted: 0 



















Eighth Denied: 0 
Granted: 0 




In part: 1 
Total: 2 
Two       
approaches: 
Four-factor 
test or     
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Ninth Denied: 6  
Granted: 18 
In part: 2  
Total: 16 
 
Denied: 10  
Granted: 10  













Trial courts in 
the Ninth Cir-
cuit apply both, 
but if using 
sliding scale 
other factors 
must be met. 
Tenth Denied: 2  
Granted: 2  
In part: 0 
Total: 4 
 
Denied: 2  
Granted: 1  



























cuit and Winter. 
Eleventh Denied: 0 
Granted: 0 
In part: 0 
Total: 0 
Denied: 0 
Granted: 1  







factors tip in 






Denied: 1  
Granted: 0 
In part: 0 
Total: 1 
Denied: 2  
Granted: 1  






No change in 
trial court.  
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A possible explanation for these different approaches turns on the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of the individual four factors in Winter; the 
public interest factor received most of the Court’s attention, while the 
success on the merits factor was given passing treatment. In addition, 
apart from the Ninth Circuit standard, the Court did not address other 
circuit courts’ treatment of the success of the merits factor or its relation 
to the other factors, and in particular to irreparable harm. The Court’s 
uneven analysis of the factors, coupled with its silence on existing flexi-
ble preliminary injunction standards, has enabled many circuits to retain 
their earlier standards. In particular, those circuits that allowed a lesser 
showing of one factor when other factors were clearly demonstrated con-
tinue to apply a similar flexible preliminary injunction standard. For 
these reasons, I also looked at trial courts’ treatment of the public interest 
factor, the trump card in the Winter decision. 
G. The Influence of the Public Interest Factor 
Because the public interest factor was uniquely important to the 
Winter decision, I singled out this factor for discussion.  The final table, 
Table 8, focuses on changes to trial courts’ analysis of the public interest 
factor. In particular, I looked at whether the trial court (1) analyzed the 
factor to determine the outcome of the injunction, (2) mentioned but did 
not analyze the factor to determine the outcome of the injunction, or (3) 
did not mention or analyze public interest factor to determine the out-
come of the injunction. 
Table 8: Post-Winter: Importance of Public Interest 
 
Public Interest Factor Pre-Winter (33)
308
 Post-Winter (41) 
Analyzed 
 
24 (72.7%) 33 (80.5%) 
Mentioned, but Not 
Analyzed 
3 (9.1%) 3 (7.3%) 
Not Mentioned or 
Analyzed 
5 (15%) 5 (12.2%) 
 
                                                 
 308. One of the pre-Winter trial court decisions could not be located, and it was unclear from 
the decision on appeal whether the trial court evaluated this factor. See case cited infra note 342 in 
Appendix A.  
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As the numbers show, there is a slight increase in the number of tri-
al courts analyzing the public interest factor, and there is a slight de-
crease in the number of courts that do not mention or analyze this factor. 
These numbers support the argument that in environmental cases, trial 
courts are spending more time on the public interest factor post-Winter—
that Winter, in fact, gave teeth to the individual factors.
309
 A brief com-
parison of how trial courts evaluated the public interest before and after 
Winter further illustrate this point. For example, in Northwest Ecosystem 
Alliance v. Rey, a pre-Winter decision, the court described the prelimi-
nary injunction standard as “irreparable injury and inadequacy of legal 
remedies.”310 The public interest was not enumerated as a factor to eval-
uate and the court merely mentioned that “[o]n balance, . . . the compet-
ing equities and the public interest weigh in favor of” the plaintiffs.311 In 
that case, the injunction was granted.
312
 
Compare that non-existent treatment of the public interest factor to 
Confederate Tribes and Bands of Yakama Nation v. U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, where the court stated the Winter standard and then evaluat-
ed each factor sequentially, first, second, third, and fourth.
313
 In discuss-
ing the public interest factor, the trial court began by stating, “Fourth, a 
preliminary injunction is in the public interest.”314 The court went on to 
weigh the harm of having baled garbage remain at the Honolulu port 




Before Winter, trial courts often did not fully analyze the public in-
terest factor because that factor was often subsumed into the balance of 
relative hardships.
316
 This lack of analysis was not always the courts’ 
fault. For example, in Defenders of Conewango Creek v. Echo Develop-
ers, LLC., the court noted the four traditional preliminary injunction fac-
tors.
317
 After addressing the first three factors, the court engaged in a 
                                                 
 309. See Newman, supra note 149, at 350 (noting that post-Winter and eBay, courts are “giving 
real teeth to the individual factors of the [preliminary injunction] test”). 
 310. Nw. Ecosystem v. Rey, No. 04–844P, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1846, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 
9, 2006). 
 311. Id. at 18. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakama Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. CV-10-
3050-EFS, 2010 WL 3434091, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 30, 2010). 
 314. Id. at *5. 
 315. Id. 
 316. See, e.g., Caribbean Marine Serv., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 676–677 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the district court abused its discretion by ordering preliminary relief when it failed to 
identify and weigh the public interests at stake). 
 317. No. 06-242 E, 2007 WL 3023927, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2007). 
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weighing of the environmental harms against economic concerns.
318
 The 
court simply noted that “general assertions [by the movant] about the 
need to protect the environment and endangered species are unavailing to 
achieve its end.”319 
Post-Winter, courts are making a more concerted effort to analyze 
the public interest factor. For example, in Hillsdale Environmental Loss 
Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the plaintiffs sought to 
enjoin the defendants from constructing a railyard under NEPA and the 
CWA because a Section 404 CWA permit was granted without the com-
pletion of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
320
 The U.S. District 
Court for the District of Kansas determined that the plaintiff had not 
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits or serious questions 
going to the merits.
321
 The court stated that failure to satisfy the first fac-
tor under either standard was sufficient for the court to deny injunctive 
relief.
322
 Instead of ending its analysis there, however, the court evaluat-
ed the balance of equities and the public interest.
323
 The court recognized 
the public interests on both sides of the debate: compliance with federal 
environmental statutes versus job growth, energy savings and congestion 
relief.
324
 The economic benefit to the public was the stronger public in-




In addition to having a specific analysis of the public interest factor, 
post-Winter orders include headings that highlight the analysis of each of 
the factors.
326
 When addressing public interest, courts post-Winter more 
clearly note the public interest competing with environmental concern.
327
 
This is where the environmental plaintiffs’ concern becomes a reality. 
Which public interest, environmental or economic concerns, deserves 
greater weight? In Winter, the majority valued the public interest in mili-
tary readiness above the public interest in preserving marine mammals. 
By focusing its analysis on the public interest factor, the Supreme Court 
                                                 
 318. Id. at *5. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10-CV-2008 
CM/DJW, 2011 WL 3847383 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2011). 
 321. Id. at *2. 
 322. Id. at *3. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. See, e.g., W. Watersheds Project v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 774 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (D. 
Nev. 2011), aff’d, 443 F. App’x 278 (9th Cir. 2011) (including four headings in the analysis section: 
Likelihood of Success on the Merits, Irreparable Harm, Balancing the Equities, Public Interest). 
 327. Id. at 1103. 
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has reenergized this factor, which often does not depend on what evi-
dence is presented, but on what personal values a judge holds. 
IV. ASSESSMENT: LOTS OF FORM AND LITTLE SUBSTANCE 
What do these quantitative and qualitative analyses demonstrate? 
First, numbers are not enough. Numbers show little change in environ-
mental preliminary injunction standards pre- and post-Winter, but they 
do not explain why there is little change. A textual analysis of trial and 
circuit court opinions addressing preliminary injunction post-Winter bet-
ter explains the quantitative data. 
The textual analysis also shows that circuit courts are more likely to 
try to reconcile their earlier circuit standard with Winter than overtly 
state that a new standard applies. This is particularly true in circuits 
where the flexibility arose in the first factor—success on the merits, and 
the first factor was always evaluated. Pre-Winter, the Second, Third, 
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all had preliminary injunction 
standards that in certain instances allowed the success on the merits fac-
tor to be modified. In these instances, success on the merits became “se-
rious questions” on the merits or some variation thereof.328 
These different iterations of the first factor can be summarized as 
follows. In the Second Circuit, “serious questions” on the merits could 
replace a “likelihood of success” on the merits, as long as the plaintiff 
demonstrated both irreparable harm and a balance of hardships that 
tipped in its favor. Similarly, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits allowed for 
“serious questions” when the balance of hardships tipped in the movant’s 
favor.  “Questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult, 
and doubtful” was also permissible in the Tenth Circuit when the movant 
demonstrated that the remaining three factors—irreparable injury, bal-
ance of the injuries, and the public interest—“decidedly” tipped in its 
favor.  The Third and Seventh Circuit did not rename the first factor but, 
instead, balanced all the factors against each other so that a strong show-
ing of one factor could offset a weak showing of another. For the Sec-
ond, Third, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, success on the 
merits was an important but flexible factor. Success on the merits did not 
have to be strong or “likely” when the other factors weigh in the mo-
vant’s favor. 
The Fourth Circuit standard has also been interpreted as being a 
flexible standard, but there are two differences between the Fourth Cir-
cuit standard and the standards just reviewed and thus two possible ex-
planations for why the Fourth Circuit post-Winter took a different ap-
                                                 
 328. See supra Part III. 
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proach. One difference has to do with the order in which the factors are 
addressed, and the other has to do with the passing reference to the final 
factor—public interest. While these differences are subtle, they help ex-
plain the “fatal tension” the Fourth Circuit described in the Real Truth 
About Obama. 
The Fourth Circuit standard before Winter was commonly referred 
to as the “Blackwelder balance-of-hardship test.”329 The focus of this 
standard was on balancing the harms of the parties.
330
 Only when the 
balance tipped in the movant’s favor would the court consider the suc-
cess on the merits.
331
 This approach is different from the one taken by 
other circuits and by the Court in Winter. The Fourth Circuit in Real 
Truth About Obama interpreted the Winter standard to require all four 
factors to be satisfied “as articulated,”332 devoid of some sequential test. 
The Fourth Circuit before Winter also paid little attention to the final fac-
tor, public interest, which was an important, if not the most important, 
factor to the Court in Winter. 
When viewed this way, the Fourth Circuit was compelled to reach 
an outcome different from other circuits and to overrule its pre-Winter 
standard. Its unique approach was more difficult to reconcile with the 
Winter four-factor standard. The Fourth Circuit, however, has little im-
pact on the overall percentages of injunctions granted and denied because 
of the small number of environmental preliminary injunction requests 
this circuit reviews. 
In those circuits with the greatest number of preliminary injunction 
requests, earlier preliminary injunction standards continue today. The 
Supreme Court’s silence on the first factor helps explain why these cir-
cuits have held either expressly or impliedly that their pre-Winter stand-
ards continue. In addition, the Court’s silence on how the factors relate to 
one another has enabled courts to continue to balance the factors against 
one another so that a weaker showing in one factor can be displaced by a 
strong showing in another. Because these requests are reviewed in essen-
tially the same manner post-Winter as they were pre-Winter, it is not sur-
                                                 
 329. See Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 194 (4th Cir. 1977). 
 330. See id. at 195–96 (expressing no opinion on the merits of the issues and noting that noting 
that the “two more important factors” are irreparable injury to the plaintiff and likely harm to the 
defendant). 
 331. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 890 F. Supp. 2d 688, 
691 (S.D. W. Va. 2012) (emphasizing that “in Blackwelder, [the Fourth Circuit] instructed that the 
likelihood-of-success requirement be considered, if at all, only after a balancing of hardships is 
conducted . . . .”). 
 332. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 
2009), overruled on other grounds by Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 
S. Ct. 2371 (2010). 
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Although the Supreme Court in Winter clearly stated the prelimi-
nary injunction standard in an environmental case as a four-factor test, it 
did not explain the relationship of the four factors to each other. As a 
result, most trial courts post-Winter have been able to apply an injunction 
standard similar to the one they used pre-Winter, thereby preventing sig-
nificant changes to the number of environmental injunctions issued at the 
trial level. 
In turn, the quantitative data suggests that Winter has not created a 
stricter standard; the percentage of injunctions issued post-Winter is es-
sentially the same as the pre-Winter percentage. The qualitative data also 
suggests that Winter has not dramatically altered preliminary injunctions; 
the preliminary injunction standards recited and used by the majority of 
trial courts post-Winter are essentially the same as pre-Winter standards. 
Circuit courts recognize the Winter standard at least in form but have 
made efforts to keep all or some portion of their earlier flexible standards 
in tack. 
As expected, these findings complement each other. Because most 
trial courts employ the same standard pre- and post-Winter, the number 
of injunctions granted or denied pre- and post-Winter is similar, suggest-
ing that Winter’s effect has been mild. 
Perhaps Winter’s limited analysis and cursory approach was a good 
thing. Circuit courts would have been unwilling or unable to retain earli-
er “flexible” standards had the Supreme Court addressed all of the fac-
tors or been more explicit in how these factors interrelate. For the time 
being, Winter’s deficiencies are a blessing in disguise for the environ-
mental plaintiff.
334
 The judicial landscape for environmental preliminary 
injunctions remains relatively unchanged.
335
 
                                                 
 333. A similar effect can be seen with eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 
(2006), a Supreme Court decision that altered the standard for permanent injunctive relief. See Stacy 
Streur, The eBay Effect: Tougher Standards but Courts Return to the Prior Practice of Granting 
Injunctions for Patent Infringement, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 67, 88 (2009) (noting that eBay 
“has had a significant impact on the analytical process courts use to determine whether a patent 
holder is entitled to an injunction” but “has not had a significant and lasting impact on the outcome 
of those decisions”); see also Jedediah Wakefield & Sebastian E. Kaplan, Irreparable Harm, I Pre-
sume?, FENWICK & WEST LLP (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.fenwick.com/publications/Pages/Irrep 
arable-Harm-I-Presume.aspx (concluding that “[t]he fears that eBay and Winter heralded the end of 
injunctions in intellectual property cases have proven unfounded for trademark litigation”). 
 334. Brown & Fazio, supra note 192 (recognizing that Winter is not a “watershed moment in 
environmental law” because the sliding scale remains intact); see also Love, supra note 192, at 712 
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Appendix A: Pre-Winter Trial Court Decisions 
 










Food & Water 
Watch, Inc. v. U.S. 
Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 570 F. 
Supp. 2d 177 (D. 
Mass 2008) 
First    
Circuit 
NEPA No Analyzed Denied 
Defs. of Wildlife v. 
Hall, 565 F. Supp. 




ESA Yes Mentioned Granted 
Lands Council v. 
McNair, 2006 WL 
5883202 (D. Idaho 





Yes Analyzed Denied 
Alliance for the 
Wild Rockies v. 
Wood, 2008 WL 
2152237 (D. Idaho 





Yes Analyzed Granted 
Heartwood, Inc. v. 
Peterson, 2008 WL 
2151997 (E.D. Ky. 
May 21, 2008) 
Sixth Cir-
cuit 
ESA No Analyzed Denied 
Wilderness Work-
shop v. U.S. Bu-
reau of Land 
Mgmt., 2008 WL 
11946818 (D. Co-
lo. Apr. 30, 2008)   
Tenth 
Circuit 
NEPA Yes Analyzed Denied 
Ocean Mammal 
Inst. v. Gates, 546 












                                                                                                             
(describing the Ninth Circuit’s articulation of the “serious questions” sliding-scale test post-Winter 
as a “godsend” for those who live and practice in the Ninth Circuit). 
 335. See Lawrence Hurley, Debate Continues over Impact of Supreme Court’s Whale Ruling 
on Enviros’ Bid to Halt Projects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
gwire/2010/11/01/01greenwire-debate-continues-over-impact-of-supreme-courts-47696.html (quot-
ing Susan Jane Brown, staff attorney at the Western Environmental Law Center, as stating that Win-
ter “doesn’t reshape the judicial landscape”). 
 336. Affirmed by Ninth Circuit on July 2, 2008. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981 (9th 
Cir. 2008).  
210 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:155 
S. Utah Wilderness 
Alliance v. Office 
of Surface Mining 
Reclamation & 
Enforcement, 2007 
WL 4300095 (D. 








Act   
Yes Analyzed Denied 
Natural Res. Def. 
Council v. 
Kempthorne, 
525 F. Supp. 2d 
115 (D.D.C. 2007) 
D.C.   
Circuit 
Permits to 




Yes Analyzed Denied 
Berryessa for All v. 
U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation, 
2007 WL 4209551 








Pleasant L.L.C. v. 
Johnson, 2007 WL 
1486869 (D. Ariz. 
May 21, 2007)337 
Ninth 
Circuit 




est Prot. Campaign 
v. Rey, 2007 WL 
3034931 (E.D. Cal. 









ers, L.L.C., 2007 
WL 3023927 






No Analyzed Denied 
 
Ohio Valley Envtl. 
Coal. v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 
528 F. Supp. 2d 





Yes Analyzed  Granted  
Colo. Wild, Inc. v. 
U.S. Forest Serv., 
523 F. Supp. 2d 




NEPA Yes Analyzed Granted 
                                                 
 337. Affirmed on appeal in November 2007. Protect Lake Pleasant, LLC v. Johnson, 252 F. 
App’x 856 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 338. Reversed and remanded post-Winter. 577 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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N. Plains Res. 
Council v. U.S. 
Bureau of Land 
Mgmt., 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 25238 




NEPA  No Analyzed Granted 
Friends of Magu-
reewock, Inc. v. 
U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 498 F. 
Supp. 2d 365 (D. 
Me. 2007) 




No Analyzed  Denied 
Colo. Wild, Inc. v. 
U.S. Forest Serv., 
2007 WL 1834029 








ject v. Kraayenbrink,  
2006 WL 2735772 




NEPA Yes Analyzed Granted 
Geertson Farms, 
Inc. v. Johanns, 
2007 WL 776146 




NEPA  No 
 
 
Not        
Mentioned 
Granted 
Nw. Bypass Grp v. 
U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 470 F. 
Supp. 2d 30 (D. 
N.H. 2007) 





No Analyzed Denied  
Lands Council v. 
McNair, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 98785 






Yes Analyzed  Denied 
Fibermark N. Am. 
Inc. v. Jackson, 
2007 WL 4157235 







Yes Analyzed Granted  
                                                 
 339. Affirmed on appeal. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 340. Permanent injunction granted May 3, 2007. Geertson Farms Inc. v. Johanns, No. C 06-
01075 CRB, 2007 WL 1302981 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2007), aff'd sub nom. Geertson Seed Farms v. 
Johanns, 541 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2008), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, 570 
F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 
S. Ct. 2743 (2010), aff'd sub nom. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 570 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009), 
rev'd and remanded sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010). 
 341. Affirmed en banc. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2007). 
212 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:155 
Baykeeper v. U.S. 
Army Corp of 
Eng’rs, 2006 WL 
2711547 (E.D. Cal. 
Sept. 20, 2006) 
Ninth 
Circuit 






tion v. U.S. Forest 
Serv., 2006 WL 
2454438 (E.D. Cal. 





No  Not        
Mentioned  
Granted 
Blanco v. Burton, 
2006 WL 2366046 
(E.D. La. Aug. 14, 
2006) 
 








No  Analyzed Denied   
No IR 
Natural Wildlife 
Fed. v. Harvey, 
820 F. Supp. 2d 










Earth Island Inst. 
v. U.S. Army Corp 
of  Eng’rs342 
Ninth 
Circuit 
NEPA Yes Unclear Denied 
Natural Res. Def. 
Council v. U.S. 
Army Corp of 
Eng’rs, 457 F. 









Alliance v. Rey, 
2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1846 (W.D. 
Wash. Jan. 9, 2006) 
Ninth 
Circuit 





v. U.S. Army Corp 
of Eng’rs, 405 F. 






No   Analyzed Denied 
Anglers of the Au 
Sable v. U.S. For-
est Serv., 402 F. 








Yes  Analyzed Granted 
Sierra Club v. 
Bosworth, 2005 
WL 3096149 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 14, 2005) 
Ninth 
Circuit 
NEPA  Yes  Mentioned Granted 
                                                 
 342. Reversed on appeal. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng’rs, 442 F.3d 1147 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
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Appendix B: Post-Winter Trial Court Decisions                                        
(Nov. 9, 2008–Nov. 8, 2011) 
 















sity v. U.S. 
Forest Serv., 
820 F. Supp. 













v. U.S. Army 
Corp of Eng’rs, 
2011 WL 
3847383 (D. 











Bay v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Com-
merce, 810 F. 
Supp. 2d 320 









zar, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 
151556 (C.D. 








Shellfish v. U.S. 
Army Corp of 
Eng’rs, 800 F. 
Supp. 2d 312 





No  Analyzed Denied Winter & 
Circuit 
Standard 
214 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:155 
Audubon Soc. 
of Portland v. 
Nat’l Marine 
Fisheries 
Serv., 849 F. 
Supp. 2d 1017 
(D. Ore. 2011) 
Ninth 
Circuit 
ESA Yes Not     
Mentioned 
Denied Ninth   
Circuit  
Sierra Club v. 















Desert Ass’n v. 
McDaniel, 
2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 100815 
(D. Ore. July 





&   
Wilder-
ness Act 
Yes Analyzed Granted No standard 






















Serv., 791 F. 
Supp. 2d 979 
(D. Ore. 2011) 
Ninth 
Circuit 
NEPA Yes Analyzed Granted Winter 
Aquifer Guard-
ians in Urban 
Areas v. Fed. 
Highway Ad-
min., 779 F. 







No  Analyzed Denied Winter 
                                                 
 343. I was unable to locate this trial court decision. The appellate decision however affirmed 
the trial court’s decision to grant in part and deny in part the injunction. See Sierra Club v. U.S. 
Army Corp of Eng’rs, 645 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 344.  Permanent injunction construed as a preliminary injunction. 
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W. Watersheds 
Project v. Bu-
reau of Land 
Mgmt., 774 F. 









Serv., 803 F. 

















Serv., 776 F. 





NEPA Yes  Analyzed Granted  Winter and 
Circuit 
Standard 
Ctr. for Food 
Safety v. Vil-
sack, 753 F. 





NEPA No  Analyzed Granted Winter 
Alliance for the 










v. U.S. Dep’t 
of the Interior, 
755 F. Supp. 






Yes Analyzed Granted Winter 
                                                 
 345. Affirmed on appeal. See W. Watersheds Project. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 443 F. App’x 
278 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 346. Affirmed on appeal. See Conservation Congress v. U.S. Forest Serv., 489 F. App’x 151 
(9th Cir. 2012). 
 347. Reversed on appeal. See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 348. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 622 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2010), reh’g 
denied, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011) (withdrawing and replacing prior opinion on denial of rehear-
ing en banc). 



















well, 2010 WL 
5019879 (D. 







No Analyzed Denied Winter 
Habitat for 
Horses v. Sala-
zar, 745 F. 




















Inst. v. Martin, 
588 F. Supp. 2d 







in part  
Winter and  
Circuit 














Yes  Mentioned Denied Winter and 
Circuit 
Standard 
                                                 
 349. The permanent injunction on this matter was denied by the trial court and affirmed by the 
First Circuit. Animal Welfare Inst. v. Martin, 668 F. Supp. 2d 254 (D. Me. 2009), aff’d, 623 F.3d 19 
(1st Cir. 2010). 
 350. Affirmed on appeal. See Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Grantham, 424 F. App’x 635 
(9th Cir. 2011). 





v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Agric., 2010 
WL 343409 
(E.D. Wash. 







Yes Analyzed Granted Winter and 
Circuit 
Standard  
In Def. of Ani-
mals v. U.S. 
Dep’t of the 
Interior, 737 F. 
















Voices v. Chu, 
725 F. Supp. 












D.C. Circuit  
Consol. Delta 
Smelt Cases, 
717 F. Supp. 






No Analyzed Granted Winter  
City of New-
burgh v. Sar-
na, 690 F. 









No Not     
Mentioned 
Denied  Winter and 
Circuit 
Standard 
Sierra Club v. 
Clinton, 689 F. 





NEPA Yes Analyzed Denied  Winter and 
Circuit 
Standard  
Del. Dep’t of 





No Analyzed Granted 
in part, 
Winter  
                                                 
 351. Affirmed in part, dismissing appeal in part. City of Newburgh v. Sarna, 406 F. App’x 557 
(2d Cir. 2011). 
218 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:155 
U.S. Army 
Corps of 
Eng’rs, 681 F. 
Supp. 2d 546 
(D. Del. 2010) 
CZMA denied 
in part  
In Def. of Ani-
mals v. Sala-
zar, 675 F. 














S. Fork Band 
Council of W. 
Shoshone  v. 
U.S. Dep’t of 
the Interior, 
643 F.Supp.2d 







No Analyzed Denied Winter  
League to Save 













No Analyzed Granted 
in part  
Winter  
Def. of Wildlife 
v. Salazar, 812 





ESA No  Analyzed Denied  Winter 
San Luis Val-
ley Ecosystem 
Council v. U.S. 
Fish & Wild-
life Serv., 657 
F. Supp. 2d 




NEPA Yes Analyzed Granted Winter and 
Circuit 
Standard  
                                                 
 352. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. S. Fork Band Council of W. Shoshone v. U.S. Dep’t 
of the Interior, 588 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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Or. Natural 
Desert Ass’n v. 
Kimbell, 2009 
WL 1663037 
(D. Ore. June 























Yes  Analyzed Denied Winter and 
Circuit 
Standard  
City and Cnty. 
of Honolulu v. 
EPA, 2009 WL 
855896 (D. 











zar, 612 F. 














ry Canyon v. 
Dep’t of Ener-
gy, 612 F. 





NEPA Yes Analyzed Granted Winter and 
Circuit 
Standard  
Sierra Club v. 
U.S. Forest 
Serv., 593 F. 





NEPA No  Analyzed Granted 
in part 
Winter  
                                                 
 353. Vacated in part. Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Kimbell, No. 07-1871-HA, 2009 WL 
1663037 (D. Ore. June 15, 2009). 
 354. Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded. Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Timchak, 
323 F. App’x 512 (9th Cir. 2009). 
220 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:155 
2008)  
Uranium 








NEPA No Not      
mentioned 
Denied  Circuit 
Standard 
 
